Military activity claimed by the Taliban in Afghanistan increased to its highest point in 2009 amidst what the group calls its “Victory” campaign. The campaign, which commenced on April 30, was announced by the Deputy Leader of the Taliban, Mullah Bradar, as a response to the troop surge proposed by US and NATO countries.
Tactics employed within the campaign mirror those used by the Taliban in their daily operations - ambushes, bombings, raids, rocket launchings, and suicide bombings – but are concentrated in cities and suburbs to “tighten the noose” around the enemy. One such operation within the “Victory” campaign occurred on May 12, when 30 Taliban “martyrdom-seekers” launched a large-scale offensive on provincial buildings in Khost province in Eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban claimed the deaths of 50 foreign and Afghan soldiers in the offensive, using suicide bombings and gunfire to wreak devastation and destruction.
The announcement of the “Victory” campaign was featured in the 35th issue of the Taliban’s monthly electronic magazine, al-Samoud, which was posted on jihadist forums on April 27, and was subsequently distributed as a separate posting on the Taliban’s website and jihadist forums on April 29. Mullah Bradar declared:
| “Operations within ‘Victory’ will include all contemporary tactics such as martyrdom-seeking operations, explosive devices, bomb-laden vehicles, penetration operations, ambushes, surprise attacks. We will target the military bases of occupation forces, diplomatic centers, and supply and logistics convoys, and senior officials in the agent administration, including parliamentarians, staff of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and staff of the intelligence.” | ||
As he declared the campaign, Mullah Bradar warned all Afghans employed by the Afghan government to leave their posts and join the ranks of the Taliban. He also warned employees and owners of private sector corporations and construction and transportation companies in Afghanistan to cease their transactions with foreign forces and the Afghan government, or else face consequences by the Taliban.
Since the commencement of operations within “Victory” on April 30, through May 31, 2009, nearly half of the 350+ claimed Taliban attacks within the period fall within this campaign. Taliban communiqués differentiate between general attacks and those attacks included in “Victory.” The number of claimed attacks in May, including those identified a part of the campaign, significantly surpass the number in previous months and boast of a greater number of human and material losses to the enemy. Attacks have increased in number from month to month since the beginning of 2009, and fulfill the pledge of the Taliban to achieve greater success in the spring season. In the editorial to the 33rd issue of al-Samoud, posted on jihadist forums on February 27, the Taliban said:
| “Complete victory and clear conquest await the Islamic Ummah and the mujahideen for the Cause of Allah in the approaching spring of 1430, with permission from Allah. It will be our spring, with grace of Allah, a spring of victory and conquest. Our history proves that we shall never be defeated by foreign invaders.” | ||
In addition to the large-scale offensive in Khost on May 12, within its “Victory” campaign, the Taliban claimed a similar tactic in the Afghan capital Kabul on May 13, deploying nine suicide attackers to a military barracks and engaging in a clash. The Taliban reported the destruction of two military vehicles belonging to Italian forces and death of all who were on board. That same day, in Badghis province, the Taliban reported killing a total of 33 Afghan soldiers and two foreign soldiers as a result of an ambush on a joint military convoy moving from Herat province towards the center of Badghis. In another example of its “Victory” operations, the Taliban claimed killing 30 American soldiers in a single armed attack in Saydabad district in Wardak province on May 7.
Similar to its “Lesson” operations in spring 2008, the “Victory” campaign demonstrates Taliban capabilities and strength throughout Afghanistan, particularly in the south in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, and in the east in Khost province. Its use of ambushes, bombings via improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and suicide bombings involving the deployment of multiple Taliban fighters to cause mass-casualty incidents serves to compel foreign forces to withdrawal and Afghan forces to lay down their arms in support of the Taliban. Taliban propaganda prior to and during the “Victory” campaign threatened to increase military activity in proportion to increases in the enemy presence, focusing on the troop serge. “Victory” is the culmination of that threat. Through its quantity and quality of operations throughout the 34 provinces of Afghanistan, the Taliban strives to show that enemy success in Afghanistan is impossible, and should additional troops be brought to Afghanistan, the numbers of enemy dead will only increase.