Winston Churchill described Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Were he alive today, the famed British statesman, who also knew something about fighting extremist Muslim tribesmen along Pakistan’s lawless frontier,[1] would likely have characterized al-Qaeda in identical terms. In this respect, the perennial question for at least the past five years has been whether al-Qaeda is on the march or on the run?[2] No less frequently the answer has presented a mixed picture of a movement under enormous pressure while simultaneously demonstrating a remarkable resiliency and capacity to adapt and adjust to even its opponents’ most consequential countermeasures.
That al-Qaeda has been able to survive as long as it has, however, is not just a matter of resilience and adaptability but also of sanctuary and safe haven. Al-Qaeda’s success in creating such a space in Pakistan following its near defeat and expulsion from Afghanistan during late 2001 and early 2002 largely accounts for its continued longevity. But equally important is the evidence that al-Qaeda is as focused as it is driven: identifying and stubbornly pursuing a grand strategy for victory that, however divorced from reality, has nonetheless sustained the movement and rallied its fighters and supporters.
On the one hand, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is indisputably being pressed to an extent not seen since the opening phases of the war on terrorism six and seven years ago. The systematic killing of nine key senior al-Qaeda commanders and the capture of a tenth since July 2009 alone has appreciably thinned al-Qaeda’s once deep bench of battle-hardened operatives. The movement’s ranks have been “decimated,” according to a senior American counterterrorism official who was interviewed by National Public Radio’s Tom Gjelton last February. The unnamed official went on to explain that al-Qaeda "is really, really struggling. These attacks have produced the broadest, deepest and most rapid reduction in al-Qaida senior leadership that we've seen in several years." Another senior US intelligence community officer, quoted in the same report, similarly termed the results of intensified Predator and Reaper unmanned drone attacks as "a significant, significant degradation of al-Qaida command and control.” He went on to note how, “In the past, you could take out the No. 3 al-Qaida leader, and No. 4 just moved up to take his place. Well, if you take out No. 3, No. 4 and then 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, it suddenly becomes a lot more difficult to revive the leadership cadre."[3]
But, on the other hand, while these strikes have incontestably cast new doubts on al-Qaeda’s continued vitality, if not longevity, they have also arguably come at a high price. Not only have the attacks stoked increased anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and declining support for the US-led war on terrorism in that country, but they have further undermined the parlous stability of the Pakistani state and, according to some reports, have also generated new support for precisely the same militant jihadi groups whose elimination is the goal of American policy in Pakistan.[4]
Moreover, for as many reasons as one has always been able to argue that al-Qaeda is on the run, sufficient arguments can be summoned to show that the movement in fact is on the march. Today, for example, al-Qaeda is making fresh inroads in countries as diverse as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria, the Yemen, and Somalia. And, however much its strength has been appreciably diminished in key operational theatres like Iraq by the “surge” of American ground forces in 2007 and the Sunni tribal “awakening” that preceded it, the recent spate of suicide bombings in that country demonstrates that al-Qaeda is still operationally capable and very much alive. Further, as even the aforementioned two unidentified US counterterrorism officials themselves admitted in the NPR interview, the threat of terrorist attack against the US, Britain, and other countries in Europe and elsewhere has not receded. They point to the roughly 100 terrorists who are believed to have already, in their words, "graduated" from al-Qaeda training camps in Pakistan and deployed back either to their native and adopted homes to undertake terrorist operations in the West.[5]
Al-Qaeda, accordingly, may be seen still to be clinging to a multi-pronged strategy that they are convinced will succeed. It is one that arguably embraces at least six separate lines of operation:
1. Through its presence in some seven different operational theatres——Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, North Africa, East Africa, the Yemen, and Europe, among them——al-Qaeda seeks to overwhelm, distract, and exhaust its adversaries. Given the both the US and the world’s profound economic travails and attendant financial upheaval, al-Qaeda likely perceives the imminent success of this strategy of attrition more tangible than at any previous time. As Gabriel Weimann pointed out in the March 2009 edition of InSITE in his article titled, “Econo-Jihad,” “Monitoring al-Qaeda’s online statements, videos, audio messages, letters and press releases reveals that Jihadists see Econo-Jihad as a promising weapon of terror, targeting Western financial systems and economic infrastructure. Moreover . . . they see the current crisis as a result of their activities. This is not a new idea for Bin Laden and his supporters but it certainly became more appealing for them recently.”[6]
2. In tandem with the above, al-Qaeda also actively seeks to create, foster, and encourage fissures and divisions within the global alliance arrayed against it. This entails the selective targeting of coalition partners in the US-led war on terrorism both in operational theatres (e.g., attacks directly specifically against perceived “weaker” NATO partners committed to the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan such as the British, Canadian, Dutch, and German contingents) and at home——through attacks on mass transit and other “soft” targets in the national capitals and major cities of European countries allied with the US (e.g., the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings and the terrorist plots with links back to Pakistan foiled during 2008 and 2009 in Barcelona and Amsterdam).
3. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda continues to conduct local campaigns of subversion and destabilization in critical operational theatres where failed or failing states provide new opportunities for al-Qaeda to extend its reach and consolidate its presence. Countries and regions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Algeria, the Sahel, East Africa, and especially, Somalia fall within this category.
4. Al-Qaeda also actively continues to provide guidance, assistance, and other help to local affiliates and associated terrorist movements. This support often appreciably enhances local and regional terrorist attack capabilities and strengthens the resilience of these groups thus presenting more formidable challenges to national and local police, military forces and intelligence agencies. Al-Qaeda thus works behind the scenes in these theatres as a “force multiplier” of indigenous terrorist capacity both in terms of kinetic as well as essential non-kinetic operations——including information operations, propaganda, and psychological warfare.
5. As previously noted, al-Qaeda continues to seek out citizens of enemy countries, especially converts to Islam, who possess “clean” passports and thus can be more easily deployed for attacks in Western countries without necessarily arousing suspicion. In other words, these persons whose birth names remain in their passports rather than an adopted religious name potentially provide al-Qaeda with the ultimate “fifth column”——individuals whose appearance and names will not arouse the same scrutiny from immigration officials, border security officers, an national police and security and intelligence services that persons from Muslim countries with Muslim-sounding names might. European nationals who have converted to Islam and are citizens of countries that are part of the American visa waiver program have thus far prominently figured in al-Qaeda’s strategy.
6. Al-Qaeda continues to be as opportunistic as it is instrumental. In this respect, while its leaders doubtless continue to plan and plot major international terrorist attacks on a grand scale, they also are constantly monitoring al-Qaeda’s enemies defenses: seeking gaps and opportunities that can be quickly and effectively exploited for attacks.
Across the board, al-Qaeda’s continued ability to implement the above strategies on multiple operational levels in a variety of different theatres is proof of its resilience, implacability and the formidable challenge to international security that it still presents. Hence, while the thinning of its ranks achieved by the aforementioned Predator and Reaper unmanned drone attacks may indeed have weakened Al-Qaeda, it is arguably far too early to declare victory over this formidable and intractable adversary.
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1 As a young subaltern, over a hundred years ago Churchill likely fought the great grandfathers of the Taliban tribesmen today battling the Pakistan Army in the Swat Valley and Buner District. See Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force—An Episode of the Frontier War (Rockville, MD: Arc Manor, 2008).
2 See Bruce Hoffman, “Reports of al-Qaeda’s Death May be Greatly Exaggerated,” InSITE: The Official Newsletter of SITE Intelligence Group, vol. 1, no. 3, 13 June 2008, pp. 3-8.
3 National Public Radio, 3 February 2009 accessed at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100195353
4 3 June 2009 accessed at: http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=b951d70b-db5e-4875-a5b9-4501e713943d.
5 Quoted in Gjelten, “US Officials: Al-Qaida Leadership Cadre 'Decimated'.”
6 Gabriel Weimann, “Econo-Jihad: How Terrorists See the Global Economic Crisis,” InSITE: The Official Newsletter of SITE Intelligence Group, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 2009), pp. 11-15.