Is Laskhar-e-Toiba the Next Hezbollah?

Then-Deputy Secretary of State Armitage’s famous description of Hezbollah is a cautionary tale for those who argue either that terrorism never works or that it is an irredeemably failed strategy. Not only has Hezbollah not been taken down, but to the contrary it is today the most politically powerful party in Lebanon. With formidable parliamentary representation, a rock solid constituency that extends even beyond its core Lebanese Shi’a base, and the new-found legitimacy provided militarily by its performance in the 2006 Second Lebanon War and politically by developments like the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s decision to open discussions with its political wing——Hezbollah provides an example of how a terrorist movement can effectively transform itself from an international pariah to a respected political powerhouse.

This transformation was of course made possible by a variety of additional developments and circumstances. The longstanding disenfranchisement of the Lebanese Shi’a under an anachronistic national constitution that had failed to keep pace with profound demographic change was one factor. The power vacuum created by the Lebanese state’s chronic weakness and decades of civil war and battling rival militias was another. The active state sponsorship of both Syria and especially Iran was absolutely critical as well. But as the potential that Hezbollah might someday rule Lebanon looms larger, it is worth examining whether the forces that have propelled that movement to such prominence, power and respectability are really so unique to Hezbollah, and so specific to Lebanon, as to completely rule out some other terrorist movement elsewhere attaining some similar feat? 

The Pakistani jihadi group, Lashkar-e-Toiba (“Army of the Pure” or LeT) provides perhaps the most interesting comparison. Indeed, a combination of Pakistan’s Lebanon-like parlous political condition coupled with LeT’s increasing boldness and growing influence would suggest that the Pakistani jihadi movement could well be on its way to possibly becoming the South Asia version of Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s Recipe For Success And Pakistan’s Febrile Mix

Hezbollah’s success may be ascribed to seven basic environmental conditions, unique situations or specific capabilities:

- First and foremost, the permissive conditions accorded by a chronically unstable, often times nearly failed, state;

- Second, the ample financial resources with which to compete with the established government and (often more) effectively engage in large-scale social-welfare activities on a national basis-- including the provision of educational opportunities, medical care, vocational opportunities, job placement, and other social-welfare activities;

- Third, the active or passive support or sponsorship of a standing state military and national intelligence apparatus;

- Fourth, excellent organization and discipline;

- Fifth, highly trained and fanatically committed fighters;

- Sixth, sophisticated public relations and information operations; and,

- Seventh, an international presence with global reach.

LeT remarkably has parts or all of each of these arguably requisite characteristics. It thrives in an environment long characterized by weak, ineffective governance. Not only is the established government’s political will to address the power of a non-state entity like LeT lacking, but LeT together with its thinly veiled political wing, the Markaz Dawaat wal Irshad (“Center for Invitation [to Islam] and Instruction” or MDI), now known as Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD), runs a network of schools, hospitals, medical clinics, vocational centers, and religious compounds that has built a loyal and supportive constituency. Indeed, in the aftermath of the tragic 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, the JuD was able to mobilize and distribute vital humanitarian relief and assistance faster than the Pakistani government was able to.[2]

Throughout its history, LeT has also benefited from its close relationship with the Pakistani military and intelligence service. Founded in 1986 by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, a middle-class Punjabi professor who taught at the Institute for Engineering and Technology, LeT first forged close relations with the army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate when it joined in the fighting to end the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. These relations grew even closer following the Red Army’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 when the LeT and Pakistan’s attention shifted liberating Kashmir from Indian rule. According to one estimate, the ISI was supposedly running some 30 camps for Pakistani Jihadi groups active in Kashmir by the early 1990s. A decade later the number of camps under its aegis had reportedly increased some four-fold with at least 1,000 fighters being trained annually. Prominent among the militant groups being trained, armed, and supported by the Pakistani military were LeT in addition to Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). These close ties between the LeT, the Pakistani military and its intelligence service continue today.

Like Hezbollah, LeT is a well organized and highly disciplined organization, paying particularly close attention to the needs of its fighters and their families. LeT jihadis, for example, are paid monthly salaries and receive additional benefits. Their families are especially well looked after with loans, for instance, made available for commercial or personal reasons in addition to access to the movement’s hospitals, medical clinics, and schools.[4]

The November 2008 Mumbai attacks dramatically demonstrated the excellent training LeT cadre receive, the command-and-control over operations that it exercises and the organization’s disciplined focus. The simultaneous assaults against the city’s central train station, the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower and Oberoi hotels and a Jewish community center, were systematically executed by trained commando-like teams deployed as part of an evident command and control apparatus that orchestrated their deployment and coordinated their assaults. Schooled in the use of automatic weapons and apparently well versed in close quarters combat tactics, the gunmen were able to stand their ground against furious security force response and counter-assault. The operation also showed detailed surveillance, directed intelligence gathering and meticulous logistical preparation. Previous LeT operations in India evidenced many of these same characteristics, including: the series of coordinated bombings credited to the group that rocked New Delhi in 2005 which killed 62 persons and the December 2001 joint attack (with JeM) on the Indian Parliament nearly brought Pakistan and India to the brink of war.

LeT is also noteworthy for the sophistication of its communications and especially its effective websites. At least a decade ago, the movement’s website was announcing its unremitting enmity to India, Israel and the U.S. alike. With multi-lingual sites in English, Arabic, and Urdu, LeT web designers and web masters became much in demand by allied and associated jihadi movements in other South Asian and South East Asian countries.

Finally, like Hezbollah, LeT has a global presence with operatives and operations spread literally across the globe. LeT personnel have been arrested in Australia (Willie Brigitte) and the United States (Ali al-Timimi).[5] It claims that its members have fought in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Iraq, the Philippines, and of course Kashmir and India as well. And, one of the British Muslims who staged the 7 July 2005 suicide attacks in London, Shehzad Tanweer, reportedly attended a religious school run by LeT during his two month stay in Pakistan[6]

The similarities between Hezbollah and the LeT are thus quite striking. This is not either to overlook or ignore some key situational differences. Rather, it is to note that the concatenation of circumstances and constellation of forces that have effectively established Hezbollah nationally, regionally, and internationally may well achieve a similar future transformation of the LeT——a development that certainly bears watching.

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1 Ian Black, “UK Ready for Talks with Hezbollah,” The Guardian (London), 5 March 2009.

2 “All about Jamaat-ud-Dawa,” NDTV, 11 December 2008. Accessed at http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/mumbaiterrorstrike/Story.aspx?ID=NEWEN20080076123&type=News

3 Mark J. Roberts, “Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 48 (January-April 2008), p. 107.

4 Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihadi Culture,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 9 (November/December 2000), pp. 120-121.

5 In 2003, nine U.S. citizens and three foreign nationals were indicted by a U.S. District Court in Virginia and charged with conspiracy to levy war against the U.S. and also conspiring to provide material support to al-Qaeda.

6 Gethin Chamberlain, “Attacker ‘was recruited’ at terror group’s religious school,” The Scotsman, 14 July 2005. Accessed at http://news.scotsman.com/londonbombings/Attacker-was-recruited-at-terror.2642907.jp.