Introduction:
After the U.S.-led coalition forces intervened in Afghanistan in October 2001, multiple threat groups in Afghanistan including the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda relocated to tribal Pakistan. Nearly seven years after, Pakistani security forces, primarily the army, is fight a high intensity insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), the tribal belt separating Afghanistan from Pakistan. The insurgent and terrorist groups located on that rugged border mount attacks against U.S. led coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan and against Pakistani forces and other targets in Pakistan. The spillover effect of the insurgency in FATA into mainland Pakistan is profound.
In 2008-9, the insurgency has spread from FATA to adjacent areas notably to Swat, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, and certain parts of Baluchistan. As a result of the fighting between the military and the Pakistan Taliban, about 5.5 million people have been displaced from their homes in Swat, one the destination for tourism in Pakistan. Of the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the first half of 2009, 4.5 million are registered and at least another one million are unregistered. About another million have been displaced from FATA and they live throughout Pakistan. With the Pakistani military planning to step up operations in South Waziristan, the IDP numbers are likely to grow sharply in the second half of 2009. A tiny minority of the IDPs are supporters and sympathizers of the Pakistani Taliban.
To ease the pressure of the Taliban operational and support infrastructures in FATA, Pakistani Taliban, al Qaeda and Lashkar e Jhangvi have been mounting attacks in mainland Pakistan. Outside FATA, the two provinces that have suffered most are the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and Punjab. Although Baluchistan faces a significant threat from nationalist insurgents, Sindh and Baluchistan are the least affected by politico-religious groups. The Pakistani Taliban intends to establish a presence in Southern Punjab and in Sindh, especially in Karachi. Although support for violence and the Taliban style of governance has decreased dramatically in FATA and elsewhere in Pakistan in 2008, the threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban, al Qaeda, Lashkar e Jhangvi remains significant.
The Context:
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the seeds of extremism in Pakistan were planted in 1979. Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan became the single most important frontline state in the fight against the Soviets. To fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, General Zia, the then ruler of Pakistan, harnessed religion to mobilize the Muslims to achieve a political goal. As the fight was framed in the context of a holy war, a Sunni extremist movement emerged. To fight against the superpower and remain in power, Zia used both US and Saudi funding to fight the Soviets and to Islamize Pakistan. The protracted anti-Soviet multinational Afghan campaign (1979-1989) militarized a segment of the Sunnis globally with Pakistan as its epicenter. Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir had many volunteers from Pakistan and overseas. From Pakistan, including Karachi, those who went to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir were from the Deobandhi tradition.
Most recruits came from the heart of Pakistan. Known as the Seraiki belt, the region located in Punjab touches the borders of Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan. An underdeveloped region, the Seraiki belt spawned most of the militant groups such as the Harkatul Mujahidin created in Dera Ismail Khan (NWFP), Laskhar e Jhangvi and Sipai Sahabah Pakistan from Jiang (Punjab) and Jaysh-e-Mohommed from Bhawalpur (Punjab). Most of the fighters came from northern and southern Punjab. For example Muridhe in Punjab produced Lashkar-Toiba.
In parallel, the threat was compounded by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 following the fall of the Shah, Iran and Saudi Arabia poured funds into Pakistan. Both ideologically and organizationally, Saudi Arabia and Iran began to empower Sunni and Shia communities. Iranian funding strengthened the Shia and the Saudi funding strengthened the Sunni communities. Their funding streams also strengthened the Shia and Sunni extremism and spawned their own political extremist and violent groups. With Saudi funding to counter the growing Iranian influence, there was a shift in power to Wahabi-Deobandi. Sponsored by the ruling family, the Kingdom, and the Saudi public, Saudi and Saudi sponsored preachers, schools, and mosques proliferated in Pakistan. Pakistan remains a playground for Iran-Saudi competition to fund Shia and Sunni groups.
Even after the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989, both the jihadists and their patrons particularly the House of Saud continued to sponsor the anti-Shia forces. Saudi sponsorship created fault-lines in the fabric of many societies. “When a Muslim got money, he called the other a non Muslim. Then the dynamics of politics in Pakistan changed.” In response to Saudi sponsorship, Iran stepped up its support. Throughout parts of Karachi, Iranian and Saudi influences are evident. “Pakistan’s problem has been money. Whosoever gives it is our friend.” The developments in Pakistan were no exception to the growing Sunni – Shia divide throughout the region. Sunni families rule throughout the Gulf but Shia are a significant population. They include Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. With the rise of Iran, these monarchies perceive a threat from Iran and the Shia. The US exploited the threat –“We are going to bring democracy. Even in Dubai, the biggest hospital is Iran sponsored. The hospital provides free medicine. As the Shia is impoverished, they look up towards Iran as their benefactor and patron. To counter the Shia influence, the Saudi support for the Sunni groups had an unintended consequence. Saudi support spawned a vibrant Sunni extremist movement worldwide. Until al Qaeda attacked Riyadh in May of 2003, Saudi support enabled al Qaeda to spread its ideology.
Having defeated the Soviets, Pakistan failed to control the jubilant Sunni extremist movement that had developed its own momentum. To quote a Pakistani Police officer, Dost Ali: “After the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, when the Jihadists started to use the same tools to fight the West, the Pakistan establishment said, ‘Please do not use that tool.’ But, the successful side said: ‘Why should I not use that tool?”” Referring to the post 9-11 proliferation of threat groups seeking to attack the West, Dos Ali added: “As no one had copyright of this latest tool, there were many franchises.” Drawing an analogy with KFCs and Pizza huts, he added: “Each fulfilled their desires of accruing political and financial rewards, including going to heaven.”
The Sunni extremist movement turned their sights on the remaining superpower – the U.S, their Allies and friends. With the returnees from Afghanistan, the Shia community of Karachi was attacked throughout the 1990s. The community of Shia, a sizable population in Karachi, became the target of the Sunni extremist movement. In addition to prominent Shia clerics and other community leaders, their businessmen and professionals, notably doctors, were murdered. The law and order situation deteriorated and the police were forced to act. Before the al Qaeda attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, the attacks in Pakistan were largely triggered by the Shia-Sunni divide. A former chief of Police of Karachi, Tariq Jamil said: “The attacks of September 11, 2001, came when we were coping with sectarian terrorism.” “The situation in Karachi became bad in 2000-1”, he added. The tide turned against the West after September 11, 2001. The US attack against Afghanistan compounded the situation. It diverted the attention, focus and the energy of the Pakistani extremists and terrorists against the West. Tariq Jamil said: “Hitherto they believed that the Shia were against Islam. Now they believed that both the Shia and the US were against Islam.” To meet this escalating threat, different groups and individuals that had not worked together started to unite. The extremists from the north and south of Punjab and the jihadists from Karachi who had trained together started to work together. 
With public protests following the US led intervention in Afghanistan, the jihadists saw their activities as representing popular sentiments. Both criminals and terrorists infiltrated the protest and agitation that followed the US led coalition intervention in Afghanistan. “They wanted to do something. As they saw themselves as the vanguard, they wanted to act. They attacked the US consulate in Karachi. The attack was not triggered by local conditions in Pakistan.” After 9-11, the principal driver of threat was the developments globally. The developments in Afghanistan and Iraq were the main motivators. There was a marked increase in threat after the US led coalition intervention in Afghanistan. To facilitate the movement of operatives out of Pakistan to target countries, al Qaeda moved its most capable operative Khalid Sheikh Mohamed to Karachi. The threat in Karachi increased exponentially. Not only did al Qaeda mount attacks in Karachi but used Karachi to strike overseas. Timely US assistance enabled the Pakistani law enforcement, security and intelligence to detect and neutralized the Al Qaeda presence in Karachi. Nonetheless, the jihadist ideology persisted radicalizing both tribal and mainland Pakistani groups. Today, the bigger threat to Karachi is from likeminded Pakistan groups working with Al Qaeda operating largely from tribal Pakistan. “In parallel, with the denial of political rights, there was no way to communicate with the state, it was better to communicate with God.” A significant segment of the population turned to religion during the Musharraf period. They were the most vulnerable to extremist indoctrination and terrorist recruitment. Today, the Sunni extremist movement has developed its own momentum and threatens the world. Pakistan too suffers from Sunni extremism, nurtured during the last two decades.
The Threat to the Mainland:
The developments in the mainland were compounded by the developments in FATA. The developments in FATA were triggered by the relocation of al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and a dozen other groups from Afghanistan to Pakistan after early 2002. The threat was contained to FATA in the formative years of the insurgency. With stepped up military operations in FATA and its adjacent areas, the terrorist threat is spreading to mainland Pakistan. The terrorist attacks in mainland Pakistan in 2008 and 2009 demonstrate that the threat will persist. Despite measures to contain the threat, the threat especially in NWFP and Punjab continues to grow. Despite measures taken by government, the threat to Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, remains significant. Of the attacks, the suicide bombings remain most profound. Suicide bombings in 2008 surpassed the 2007 figures, with 61 attacks killing at least 889 people and injuring 2,072 others. The most significant attack included:
• January 10, 2008: Suicide bomber blows himself up among police guarding the High Court in Lahore, killing 24 people and wounding scores more.
• January 14, 2008 - Nine people are killed in a roadside bomb attack in a low-income neighborhood of Karachi.
• January 17, 2008 - A teenager blows himself up in a Shi'ite Muslim prayer hall in Peshawar. At least nine people are killed and 25 are wounded.
• February 9, 2008: Suicide bomber kills 25 people at opposition election rally in the northwestern town of Charsadda.
• February 22, 2008: Roadside bomb hits wedding party in northern Swat, killing at least 14 people.
• February 25, 2008: Suicide bomber kills army surgeon-general Lieutenant General Mushtaq Baig and seven other people in Rawalpindi.
• March 4, 2008: Two suicide bombers attack Pakistan Naval War College in Lahore, killing five people and wounding 19.
• March 11, 2008: Suicide bombs rip through seven-story police headquarters and a house in Lahore, killing at least 24 people and wounding more than 200.
• March 15, 2008: Bomb blast at Italian restaurant in Islamabad kills a Turkish woman and wounds 10 others, including four agents from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.
• July 2, 2008: Suicide car bomb outside the Danish embassy in Islamabad kills eight people.
• July 6, 2008: Suicide bomber kills 15 people in an attack on police in Islamabad during a rally to mark the anniversary of an army raid on the radical Red Mosque.
• August 12, 2008: Roadside bomb rips through Pakistan air force bus in Peshawar, killing 13.
• August 21, 2008: Suicide bombers blow themselves up at two gates of a weapons factory in the town of Wah, killing at least 67 people and wounding at least 100.
• September 3, 2008: Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani escapes an apparent assassination attempt when two shots hit his motorcade, just three days before the country's presidential election.
• September 6, 2008: Suicide bomber kills 33 people at a security checkpoint near Peshawar, the capital of North West Frontier Province.
• September 11, 2008: Suspected militants hurl grenades and fire into a mosque in Peshawar killing at least 20 worshippers.
• September 20, 2008: A suicide truck bomb kills 55 and wounds more than 250 and devastates the Marriott hotel in Islamabad.
Taliban-Pakistan administer punishment in Swat
The Pakistani Taliban conducted many of these attacks with the assistance of mainland Pakistani groups, notably Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a sectarian group with long standing ties both with the Taliban and with al Qaeda. In some of these attacks, al Qaeda played a crucial role in providing the training and expertise. For instance, the Danish Embassy attack and the Marriott bombing was planned jointly by al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Egyptian al Qaeda operative, Usama al Kini, who masterminded the Marriot attack was subsequently killed in a US predator attack in South Wazirstan on new years day 2009.
Recent Developments:
After the Marriott attack in Islamabad, there was a hiatus in the attacks between October 2008 and January 2009. Keen to pave the way for a peace agreement, the Pakistani Taliban refrained from mounting attacks. The Government of Pakistan and the Taliban signed a peace agreement in February 2009. Nonetheless, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi resumed attacks. Furthermore, the Taliban exploited the period of peace to advance from FATA to the adjacent areas and strength their writ especially in Swat. After the peace agreement failed to work, Swat reemerged as a key battlefield in April 2009. Outside FATA, most of the attacks were in the adjacent areas including in NWFP. Despite security measures, there were also attacks in other parts of mainland Pakistan.
• February 5, 2009 - At least 24 people are killed in a suspected suicide bombing near Shi'ite mosque in Dera Ghazi Khan, central Pakistan.
• March 3, 2009 - Gunmen attack a bus carrying Sri Lanka's cricket team outside a Lahore stadium, killing seven people, including six policemen and a driver, and wounding six of the cricketers and a British coach.
• March 30, 2009 - Militants armed with guns and grenades storm a police training centre in Lahore killing eight recruits, wounding scores and holding off police and troops for eight hours. The attack is claimed by Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. Four militants are killed and three arrested.
• April 5, 2009 - A suicide bomber blows himself up in a religious centre for minority Shi'ite Muslims in Chakwal in central Pakistan. At least 17 people are killed and about 11 seriously wounded. The attack comes a day after a suicide attack in Islamabad killed eight paramilitary soldiers.
• May 11, 2009 - Ten people are killed and more than a dozen wounded in a suicide car bomb attack on a security checkpost near Peshawar.
• May 16, 2009 - Car packed with mortar bombs blows up in the northwestern city of Peshawar, killing 11 people, including four children passing in a school bus.
• May 27, 2009 - Gunmen attack a police headquarters in the Pakistani city of Lahore, setting off a car-bomb that killed at least 24 people.
• May 28, 2009 - Two bombs explode in a market in the northwestern Pakistani city of Peshawar, killing six people.
• June 9, 2009 – The Pakistani Taliban attack the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar with guns and a truck bomb killing five people including a U.N. worker.
The Evolving Threat:
Sadly, the terrorist attacks in Pakistan, both tribal and mainland, polarized Pakistani society. Many believed that Pakistan was suffering because it was fighting America’s war. Most living in mainland Pakistan appeared unconcerned about the developments in tribal Pakistan. Until the Pakistani Taliban stepped up attacks in mainland Pakistan in 2008, the Pakistani government acted as if it was immune to the attacks in tribal Pakistan. Furthermore, those living in tribal Pakistan perceive that they are treated like “step children.” To really hurt Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban became aware that it must strike in mainland Pakistan. For Pakistani Taliban to operate effectively in the mainland Pakistan, the leadership of the Pakistani Taliban realized that it should strengthen existing ties and build new relationships with mainland groups. In addition to co-opting Lashkar-e-jhangvi, the Pakistani Taliban realized that it had to cultivate other extremist groups or individuals. Having failed in Sindh, notably in Karachi, the Taliban is moving in that direction especially in Punjab. The attack on the Sri Lankan team in Lahore in March and the attack on the Marriott, Islamabad in October 2008 demonstrated the links between the Pakistani Taliban and mainland groups. On 27 June 2009 Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Rehman Malik expressed apprehensions that all those terrorists who fled from Waziristan or Swat might take refuge in south Punjab. Today, a group by the name of Punjabi Taliban operates side by side with Pakistani Taliban in FATA. The links between groups in tribal Pakistan and groups in mainland Pakistan, notably in Punjab, is becoming apparent. 
With mounting pressure on tribal Pakistan, how best can Pakistan protect its mainland Pakistan where bulk of its population live? The best example comes from Karachi where outstanding leadership by Dr. Suhaib Suddle, the former Inspector General of Police of Sindh and a brilliant team of counter terrorism professionals were able to dismantle the threat groups and their support infrastructure. If the Karachi model can be replicated in Punjab and elsewhere in mainland Pakistan, the increasing number of attacks Lahore and other areas of Punjab as well as in the rest of Pakistan. The megacity of Karachi presents a complex and a dynamic urban political, socio-economic and security environment. Karachi is also the economic hub of Pakistan. While Islamabad is its political capital, Karachi is Pakistan’s commercial and financial city. The nation’s only port, Karachi is the lifeline both for Pakistan and landlocked Afghanistan. Between 80-90% of NATO and other forces in Afghanistan are supplied through the Karachi port. The internal and international trade and commerce boosted the economy of Karachi but also spawned an underworld. Karachi is located on the cross roads linking Asia to the Middle East. The organized and low level crime experienced in Karachi is diverse in range. Karachi is the most important transit point for Afghan and Pakistan heroin, the highest grade of heroin with the greatest demand in the western world. The underground economy of smuggled goods that penetrates Afghanistan and Pakistan starts in Karachi.
Today, the crime-ridden cosmopolitan city of Karachi faces an unprecedented terrorist threat. Pakistan has become the third highest victim of suicide attacks, the most lethal form of terrorism. After Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan experienced the highest number of suicide attacks in 2007. The city of Karachi is suffering from a wave of suicide attacks that begin in 2002. Suicide operations in Karachi were introduced in Karachi by the very same al Qaeda cell led by Khalid Sheikh Mohamed that masterminded the September 11 attacks. After relocating from Afghanistan to Pakistan, al Qaeda was able to build a secret infrastructure and operate in Karachi. Working with likeminded groups in Karachi, Al Qaeda mounted the first two vehicle borne suicide attacks in Karachi. The 2002 attacks in front of the Sheraton hotel and the US Consulate in Karachi were the first suicide attacks in Pakistan after 9-11. Similarly, before beheading was introduced in FATA in Pakistan and Iraq, Daniel Pearl was beheaded by al Qaeda working with a Pakistani group. Even the targeted assassination of leaders - the first two attempts against President Pervez Musharraf and the initially against presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto – was first in Karachi.
The Contemporary Terrorist Threat:
Extremism and its vicious by product terrorism in Pakistan is not a new phenomenon. However, terrorism assumed a serious dimension in Pakistan particularly after 9/11. Within two decades, Pakistan became a frontline state in the war in Afghanistan, first to defeat the Soviets and then to defeat the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. The developments in Pakistan were driven not only by domestic but international compulsions. Karachi was not an exception. However, the ethnic and religious complexities in Pakistan contributed to its threat landscape. Even prior Al Qaeda’s attacks on America’s iconic landmarks on September 11, 2001, Pakistan experienced serious sectarian terrorism from the mid 1990’s to 2001. However, the threat to Karachi grew significantly after 9-11. In Karachi, the Shia-Sunni attacks took toll of 376 lives from 1994 to 2001. While Al Qaeda and Taliban supported the Sunni groups, Iran supported the Shia groups. The principal actors were Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sunni groups and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, a Shia group. Sectarian terrorism remained unabated even after 9/11. As a result, 245 lives were lost between 2001 and 2007. Due to intelligence led operations and community policing, known terrorists and their supporters were arrested and the threat was reduced.
After Pakistan assisted the U.S. led coalition in its campaign, Pakistan suffered from suicide terrorism. The first vehicle borne suicide bombing in Pakistan took place in Karachi in 2002. A suicide bomber belonging to Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HuJI) operating under the banner of Harkat-ul-Mujahiden Al-Aalmi (HuMA) rammed his explosive laden car in the side of the bus carrying French technicians in front of Sheraton Hotel on May 08, 2002. HuMA, a breakaway faction of HuJI, is an associated group of Al Qaeda. HuMA mounted another vehicle borne suicide attack on U.S Consulate in Karachi on June 14, 2002. Karachi witnessed nine suicide bombings between 2002 and 2007. The bombings killed 274 persons and maimed or injured 772. 
In the first phase, the targets of the suicide bombers ranged from U.S. and its European Allies, Shia worship places and religious gatherings, and prominent political and religious leaders. Out of nine suicide bombing in Karachi, the police identified the perpetrators and their masterminds in eight cases. Some of the masterminds have been arrested and killed or are currently being hunted. The terrorist groups responsible originated in Sindh, elsewhere in Pakistan, and increasingly in tribal Pakistan. There were a few foreign terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda. 
Between 2002 and 2008, there were several other note-worthy cases of terrorism. They included the kidnapping and killing of Danial Pearl, the first American to be killed after 9-11. There were also two abortive attempts on the President of Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, and the attack on Corps Commander’s convoy in 2004. Daniel Pearl, the first American to be killed after 9-11 was targeted by Al Qaeda and LJ. HuMA targeted President Musharraf. Jundullah targeted the Corp Commander. The then Deputy Inspector General in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department in Karachi, Mr. Saud, remarked: “The investigation into attempt against the Corps Commander in Sindh revealed that the Jihadists saw not only the US government but the Pakistani government as a pro-US government institution. Furthermore, the investigation revealed that there were several new groups operating that we did not know.” While previously unknown groups such as HuMA and Jundullah continue to emerge, Karachi also suffers from known groups such as SSP and LJ operating both in Karachi and elsewhere in Pakistan.
Today, the pre-eminent threat to Karachi from outside Sindh stems from FATA. Mr. Saud, the then officer responsible for counter terrorism in Karachi said: “The leadership of Pakistan Taliban is dominated by the Mehsuds of Waziristan. With the military operations in Wazirstan, the threat has shifted to northern Punjab - Islamabad and Lahore – and to Sindh, notably to Karachi.” Added Mr. Saud: Whatever happens to the Mehsuds in FATA will have an impact on Karachi. We host the largest population of Mehsuds in Karachi.” Karachi hosts a Pashtu population (about 4 million) larger than in Peshawar (about 3 million). There is considerable contact, both communication and movement between FATA and Karachi. When an individual leaves FATA through South Waziristan, the first stop is Dera Ismail Khan, and thereafter, the main road leads is Karachi. Even from Swat, the route to Karachi. Especially with the military operations in Waziristan, the tribal population has been displaced. While the neighboring agencies received most of the displaced, Karachi was the next.
The Pakistan military operating under US pressure has used excessive force militarizing a segment of the Mehsuds. This development has led both to internal displacement and refugee flows and recruits and support for an insurgency. An astute observer of the escalating insurgency, Dost Ali of the Police in Karachi said: “Whenever you try to solve political problems through force, you face violence. The degree of force, determines degree of violence. The stronger you are, you will use more force. Over time, the weak will win. Everybody who cooperates become a friend.” The spill over effect has been profound. Since 2007, Karachi and the rest of Pakistan face a significant threat from FATA. Today, extremist and terrorist propaganda, both videos and literature from FATA are found in Karachi. The most widely used book by the Jihadists titled: “The benefits of fizail jihad” is found in Karachi. This standard book on jihad seeks to theologically justify violence. Another book available in Karachi is titled: “Islam or Fedai Hamle?” meaning “Islam or suicide bombings?” It is authored by Mufti Abu Bashar Khasmi, a likely alias and purportedly published in Dhaka, Bangladesh. In addition to using Karachi to raise funds and recruit, Pakistan Taliban and Al Qaeda in tribal Pakistan are launching operations directly and through likeminded Pakistani groups in the mainland to hit targets in Karachi. Overtime the threat to Karachi from groups outside Karachi and Sindh is likely to enhance. For instance, the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) carried more than 12 sabotage attacks on Electric Pylons/Sui Gas Pipelines and Railway Lines in around Karachi and Interior Sindh in 2007 and 2008. Although Islamist terrorist groups present the greatest threat, the threat is not only stemming from politico-religious groups alone. In addition to BLA, an ethnonationalist terrorist group from Baluchistan operating in Karachi, MQM, another ethnonationalist group from Karachi, presents an enduring threat to Karachi. The on-going feud between MQM and Sunni Tehreek has claimed several lives on both sides.
Terrorist groups in Karachi targets frontline security personnel. As law enforcement and intelligence services continue to hunt terrorists and their supporters, they too face a continuing threat. In the last two weeks of March 2008, four Police officials were killed in Karachi. Similarly, two Intelligence Bureau officials were killed in Karachi in the last week of March 2008. According to the Karachi Police: “These two events seem to be deliberate attempt to spread disaffection and undermine morale of the law enforcing agencies as well as security agencies from acting effectively against anti state inimical forces. These incidents appear to be handiwork of the militant forces, who now feel emboldened due to transitory period.” 
The Emerging Threat:
Events in Karachi are an indicator of likely future developments. Before the assassination of former prime minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad on December 27, 2007, she narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in Karachi. Of 14 terrorist incidents that took place in Sindh Province in 2007, this was the worst. The twin suicidal attacks on Benazir Bhutto welcome rally at Karsaz on October 18/19, 2007, caused most fatalities in a single terrorist incident in Pakistan. While 130 were killed, 403 were injured. Another 16 are missing, presumed dead adding the total number of fatalities to 146. The deaths included 6 police officials and the injured included 29 police officials. Most of the fatalities and injuries were caused by steel pellets emanating from the two blasts. At 00:10 hrs on October 19, 2007, as the container truck carrying Bhutto crossed Karsaz Flyover, the first blast took place on the left side of the container truck. The container truck was located between Police Mobile No. SP-6510 and private vehicle AFR-2007 Mini Pajero. The brunt of the blast was absorbed by Police Mobile No.SP-6510 thus preventing serious damage to the truck. The 1st blast also damaged Santro car No. AKR-477 and Police Mobile SP-6501. After a lapse of about 1 minute the second blast took place. The first blast was of lesser intensity whereas the second blast was of much higher intensity and caused maximum damage. 
The Karachi Police responded swiftly. The Deputy Inspector General (DIG) in charge of Investigation, Karachi, was appointed in charge and he was later replaced by DIG CID, to supervise the investigation. The crime scene was thoroughly inspected by the Investigation Team duly assisted by the Bomb Disposal Unit of Special Branch. Circumstantial evidence and other material evidence collected ruled out the possibility of explosives installed in any vehicle because both the vehicles were burnt and no evidence of explosion was found. Reports by the Bomb Disposal Unit, SIG of FIA, and FSL, material evidence collected from scene of crime, video footage, and eye witness accounts demonstrates that the explosions were result of twin suicide bombings. This conclusion is also supported by FIA’s SIG and other intelligence agencies.
A striker sleeve was recovered from the crime scene which is specifically used by suicide bombers as manual triggering mechanism to detonate explosive jackets. Similar striker sleeve of same batch number were recovered in 10 previous suicide bomb blasts, as per analysis of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and further confirmed by NWFP Police. 
During the course of investigation, the police was able to recover from the crime scene important material. The investigators recovered two heads from the scene, one with face intact with some parts of upper torso and the another severed head which was re-constructed with the assistance of doctors. Both the severed heads, found at the crime scene, have been given wide publicity in the media. A reward of Rs.5 million is also notified by the Government of Sindh for providing information leading to the arrest of the perpetrators. No claimant till to date has, so far, identified the two severed heads. In the light of previous suicide bombings in Karachi, the police short listed Pakistan Taliban (Baituallah Mahsud Group), Al Qaeda (Qari Zafar Group) (involved in 01 case), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (involved in 05 suicidal cases), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-Aalmi (involved in 02 suicidal cases), and hostile foreign agencies/miscellaneous groups. The Sindh Police arrested Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the leader of HuJI after he was released by CID Punjab on March 13, 2008. A native of South Wazirstan, Qari Saifullah Akhtar formed HuJI in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets but subsequently established links with Al Qaeda, Taliban and several Pakistani groups. Akhtar was thoroughly interrogated by JIT composed of members of all security and intelligence agencies and law enforcement authorities. The JIT after interrogating Akhtar in depth during his remand period of 14 days could not establish his indirect or direct involvement in the Karsaz incident. As Bhutto was killed subsequently in Islamabad, uncovering the identity of the masterminds of the attempt in Karachi remains of paramount significance for Pakistan. Working with other branches of government, the Sindh Police assigned the highest priority to identify the perpetrators behind the Bhutto case.
Activities of several other terrorist groups which were otherwise unknown came to fore in 2008. The Police was able to dismantle three such terrorist groups abd cells planning to mount attacks in Karachi. The Police arrested seven members of Tehreek Islami Lashkar-e-Muhammadi. The hitherto unknown group, led by Wajahat, killed 14 persons between 2002 and 2007. The victims belonged to minority communities – Christians and Ahmadi, prominent businessmen and members of a NGO. A large number of explosives were also recovered which the group intended to use for a spectacular event. Immediately before 9/10th Muharram, the police with a timely lead from Federal Security Agency were able to arrest a cell composed of five terrorists. They were planned to carry out massacre of Shia Community on the eve of 9/10th Muharram by mixing cyanide in the Sabeels installed on the route of the main Shia procession. The group from whom substantial explosives were recovered also intended to target sensitive military installations/cantonments. Karachi Police on a secret tip raided a hideout on January 29, 2008, where they encountered fierce resistance from Judnullah. A heavily armed and well entrenched terrorist group, Jundullah killed two and injured two police officials. During the prolonged encounter Police were able to kill and arrest Jundullah members. The police also recovered huge quantity of heavy weapons and explosives which the terrorists wanted to use in terrorist activities in Karachi. Members of this group were involved in attack on convoy of Corps Commander in 2004. Furthermore, Jundullah engaged in bank robberies in 2007 in Karachi to fund the Pakistani Taliban. The US Consulate, Nishtar Park blasts and Karsaz incidents indubitably indicate prowess of Al Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban and its affiliates in the mainland to undertake big operations. Despite disruption of local terrorist cells, mainland Pakistan will continue to experience periodic attacks of varying scale especially by groups operating out of FATA.
Conclusion:
Stemming from developments in Pakistan and globally, twin security threats affect Pakistan. First, Pakistan’s support for the US fight against terrorism is having an impact on the security of mainland Pakistan. The insurgency in Afghanistan and tribal Pakistan is having a direct impact on mainland Pakistan. Second, the Shia and Sunni rivalry in Pakistan and in the Middle East is affecting Pakistan. Although the Shia-Sunni threat is believed to have plateaued, it has not. When hunted by the police in mainland Pakistan, the Sunni terrorists and extremists that either supported or attacked the Shia relocated to tribal Pakistan. There were other non sectarian terrorists from Sindh that joined or linked up with al Qaeda, the Pakistan Taliban, and Punjabi Taliban in tribal Pakistan. These individuals and groups from Karachi are now fighting the Pakistani security forces in FATA and coalition forces in Afghanistan. They present a long term threat to the rest of Pakistan. Urdu speaking Pakistanis from Sindh and a smaller percentage of Sindhis united with Punjabis and Seraikis to fight both coalition forces and Pakistani military under the banner of Punjabi Taliban. This non-Pashtu Taliban grouping in FATA was organized by Abdul Rahman, a Punjabi. After crossing into South Wazirstan from Afghanistan after fighting the coalition forces in Paktika, Abdul Rahim was killed with a few Arabs in Bahgar, Angoorda on August 14, 2008. After being indoctrinated in global jihad and learning tradecraft, the Sindhi and Urdu speaking Pakistanis from Sindh are likely to return to Karachi to lead and staff terrorist and extremist groups and carry out the fight in their city - Karachi.
Rather than a primary generator of violence, mainland Pakistan is more a victim of violence. Although there will always be infrequent attacks in the mainland, with good police work, the threat to cities from the spillover of the insurgency in FATA and Afghanistan and global developments can be managed. Mainland Pakistan is not an exporter of violence but an importer of violence.