In the previous issue of inSITE, in December 2007, jihadist forums announced a month-long opportunity for individuals, organizations, and journalists to submit questions on any topic they desired to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Receiving nearly 2,000 questions across the jihadist forums discussing a variety of topics outlined in the last issue of inSITE, Zawahiri finally issued a response to the jihadist community on April 2, 2008. In an audio message over one hour and forty minutes in length, coupled with both Arabic and English transcripts, Zawahiri replied directly to several questions posted by several different individuals. He chose to answer the questions of about 90 users from the approximately one thousand users who posted, explaining that he would release his responses over two parts. Subsequently, on April 21, 2008, Zawahiri released the second part of his answers in an audio message over two and half hours in length, this time with only an accompanying Arabic transcript.
Due to the length of two sets of responses, this issue of inSITE will first focus on a few important elements of Zawahiri’s first set of answers. Subsequent issues of inSITE will address the remaining replies of Zawahiri in both parts of his responses.
Implications of the Interview
Before exploring the first part of Zawahiri’s answers, the fact that Zawahiri was able to respond these users’ questions at all deserves attention. Despite being one of the most wanted men in the world with a $25,000,000 bounty on his head, more than a thousand jihadists were able to contact him effortlessly, only needing to type a question on an online message board they likely visit each day. Demonstrating al-Qaeda’s robust online infrastructure and courier system developed over the past few years, the administrators of the jihadist forums were not only able to transfer these questions to the al-Qaeda leadership on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also to receive the responses as well, all within about two and a half months.
The idea to conduct the open interview speaks to the ingenuity of al-Qaeda, exploiting the group’s extremely effective downstream distribution of media by modifying the production chain to provide an upstream as well. Al-Qaeda benefited immensely from the interview, at once garnering significant media attention from the event and also serving as a gauge of the pulse of the jihadist community. Of course al-Qaeda constantly monitors the zeitgeist of the online jihadist community, but the interview allowed the group to understand directly the needs, desires, and goals of its constituents, as well as directly address the group’s detractors, who also submitted questions.
Aside from learning about the issues which concern the jihadist community, the interview also helped develop a deeper connection between al-Qaeda and its supporters. It is rare for average citizens in modern democracies to be able to communicate directly with their top leadership; yet, al-Qaeda has managed to do just that, allowing average jihadists to communicate directly with their leaders, strengthening the bond between jihadists and al-Qaeda. Rather than appearing aloof to his followers as an occasional image on a computer or television screen, Zawahiri’s interaction with the jihadist community bolsters al-Qaeda’s leadership over the movement and facilitates a feeling of closeness and kinship between leaders and followers.
The interview also enabled supporters to ask questions not focusing on how to build bombs or choose targets, but on seemingly mundane issues, such as how an individual’s leaving for jihad may negatively effect one’s family. One individual, for example, asked Zawahiri whether he could embark on jihad knowing that his family would be arrested, or if the individual, “who wants to go out but doesn’t find the necessary funds to leave for his wife and children.” Many of the questioners likely live in countries in which they can not safely ask for advice and guidance from local sheikhs and imams regarding jihad without drawing the attention of intelligence and security services. Thus, the chance to ask Zawahiri about the finer details of jihad provided the jihadist community with an authentic, respected source of information otherwise unavailable to many jihadists. The interview then reinforced the supporters’ perception of Zawahiri as a warrior-priest, able to justify violence unequivocally and unapologetically, while at the same time remaining an avuncular character from whom one might seek life advice. Therefore, the interview helped to connect the leadership of the jihadist movement to the jihadists who actually comprise it.
It is also important to note that while the overwhelming number of questions proposed to Zawahiri was extremely supportive of al-Qaeda, Zawahiri chose to answer questions very critical of al-Qaeda and its tactics, notably the targeting and killing of other Muslims in attacks. Zawahiri himself made a point of his approach at the beginning of his response:
| “And the listener or the reader will notice that I have given more room to the opposing questions, despite them being less than the supporting questions, and that is in order to encourage the opponents to bring their objections to light so they can be replied to and refuted and so the proofs of the mujahideen can be shown.” | ||
Zawahiri could have easily avoided critical or difficult questions asked of him. Instead, he elected to answer these questions first and foremost, even translating the questions and responses into English. Zawahiri’s decision to address critics of al-Qaeda reflects his knowledge and understanding of both those inside and outside the jihadist community. Zawahiri no doubt realizes that there are large swaths of societies around the world that he will likely never convince to join or support al-Qaeda. On the other hand, Zawahiri recognizes that there are numerous supporters of al-Qaeda who would give their lives and wealth for the movement at a moment’s notice. However, between these two extremes is a segment of the world who believe in violent jihad as a means to achieving political or social change, but disagree with al-Qaeda’s tactics, especially regarding al-Qaeda’s willingness to kill other Muslims. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Islamic Group both support violent jihad directed towards Israel or the United States, but are reticent to do the same when Muslim lives may be taken or are targeted.
With this constituency in mind, Zawahiri’s choice to focus on these difficult issues evidenced his attempt to convince these potential supporters of al-Qaeda’s point of view. Thus, the very first questions to which Zawahiri responded dealt with the issue of killing Muslims and other innocent people as part of the group’s jihad. This issue, as well as the Zawahiri’s addressing of topics related to Palestine, are discussed and described below.
On the Killing of Innocents:
Perhaps the most controversial issue within the global jihadist community, Zawahiri was unequivocally defensive on the subject of attacks in which Muslims or other innocent citizens are killed, arguing, “if there is any innocent who was killed in the mujahideen’s operations, then it was either an unintentional error, or out of necessity as in cases of al-Tatarrus [taking of human shields by the enemy].” In short, Zawahiri reasoned that the necessity to carry out jihad trumps any other concern, and that those innocents killed in operations are acceptable casualties necessary to continue with jihad.
Several questions dealt with the coordinated terrorist attacks in Algeria on December 11, 2007, claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in which the United Nations and Algerian government buildings were targeted. Numerous Algerian citizens were killed in the attacks, resulting in severe criticism for al-Qaeda. Zawahiri defended these attacks by claiming that those who were killed were not innocent, but instead were “from the Crusader unbelievers and the government troops who defend them.” Zawahiri also included a lengthy critique of the United Nations in general to legitimize attacks on the world body:
| “The operation on the 11th of December was against the headquarters of the United Nations and the Constitutional Assembly and Police Academy, not against children’s schools or women’s hospitals. And the United Nations is an enemy of Islam and Muslims- it is the one which codified and legitimized the setting up of the state of Israel and its taking over of the Muslims’ lands. It is the one which considers Chechnya an inseparable part of Crusader Russia, and consider Ceuta and Melilla inseparable parts of Crusader Spain. And it is the one which codified the Crusader presence in Afghanistan through the Bonn conference, and codified the Crusader presence in Iraq through its various resolutions, and approved the separation of East Timor from Indonesia, while it doesn’t recognize that [right] for Chechnya, nor for all the Muslim Caucasus, nor for Kashmir, nor for Ceuta and Melilla, nor for Bosnia.” | ||
Despite defending these attacks, Zawahiri does accept blame for the deaths of innocents by reciting a portion of bin Laden’s audio message released on December 29, 2007, titled, “The Way to Contain the Conspiracies.” In that message, bin Laden expressed sadness at the loss of what the group defines as innocent life, as a result of attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda. Zawahiri quoted bin Laden at length:
| “And the victims among the Muslims’ sons who fall during the operations against the unbelievers and Crusaders or their usurping agents are not intentional. And Allah knows that it saddens us greatly, and we are responsible for it, and we seek Allah’s forgiveness for it, and we ask Allah to have mercy on them and cause them to enter His spacious Gardens and compensate their families and near ones well.” | ||
Zawahiri also made clear his belief that if a Muslim works for the security forces of an Arab government, then that individual is an apostate. Referring to the Egyptian security apparatus, Zawahiri stated in no ambiguous terms that members of the Egyptian government forces were infidels and are legitimate targets:
| “I believe that the officers of the State Security – Anti-Religious Activities Branch and who investigate Islamic causes and torture the Muslims are infidels, each and every one of them. They know more about the Islamic movements than many of those movement’s members know about them. And it is permissible to kill the officers of State Security and the rest of the personnel of the police, whether we declare them unbeliever individually or declare them unbelievers in general.” | ||
Thus, while being unapologetic about al-Qaeda’s tactics, Zawahiri made sure to reaffirm to both supporters and potential supporters that the group is not deliberately targeting fellow Muslims, unless those Muslims were working with the enemies of al-Qaeda and the jihadist movement.
On Palestine
Many users posted questions about al-Qaeda’s attitude towards Hamas. Since Hamas won the parliamentary elections in January 2006, al-Qaeda has taken a very critical stance towards the group. Participating in the Palestinian government greatly vexed Zawahiri. In March 2007, he issued a scathing criticism of the group, accusing Hamas of abandoning both the Palestinians and Islam. In addition to this violation of Islamic law, Hamas now faces political and social realities given its new role as the government of Gaza, such as it’s involvement in negotiations related to the peace process. Should Hamas one day demonstrate to the jihadist world that a non-jihad solution may actually improve the lives of the Palestinians, it may weaken al-Qaeda’s relevance.
In response to an antagonistic question intimating that he was debasing Islamic unity by attacking Hamas, Zawahiri both maintained his critical view of Hamas while at the same time tempering his answer to ensure that he would not alienate all those who support, or supported, Hamas. Such a response enables Zawahiri to appeal to both jihadists who agree that Hamas has turned its back on Shari’ah by participating in democratic elections, as well as those jihadists who are part of Hamas but are disenchanted with the decisions of the leadership. Zawahiri made clear that he was only speaking negatively of the Hamas leadership, not the true mujahideen who comprise the movement. He stated:
| “I didn’t attack HAMAS; rather, I attacked the compromising leaderships of HAMAS who signed the Makkah accord. And I differentiated completely – and continue to differentiate – between the Mujahideen of HAMAS, for who I hold the utmost respect and appreciation, and the leaderships who signed the Makkah accord and have until now not gone back on that, and I continue to criticize them.” | ||
In particular, Zawahiri attempted to appeal to the military wing of Hamas, the Izz Ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Per¬haps believing that those with the guns hold the power and may be less likely to seek to engage in any sort of negotiations, Zawahiri stated that it was incumbent upon the members of the Qassam Brigades to bring their leadership back to an unequivocal stance and quit the government. Zawahiri exhorted them:
| “It is the duty of the Mujahideen of al-Qassam to advise their leaders and demand of them to return to the correct methodology, and to explain this to them. And if they don’t respond to them, then let loyalty to Allah and His Messenger come before loyalty to the organization. And if the political leaders who compromised were to sense the seriousness of the Mujahideen of al-Qassam in rejecting the rule of other than the Shari’ah and refusing to agree to the signing of the Makkah accord and the like, those leaders will most likely change their line.” | ||
An individual who claimed he was a member of Hamas and now with the Hamas government’s police force asked if it were permissible for him to remain with the police, despite the fact that the government was ruled by “man-made laws.” Zawahiri, in an answer clearly aimed at reducing support for the Hamas leadership, responded bluntly:
| “It is not permitted to work in the police force which executes and protects the man-made laws and rules and forces the people to abide by them, and Allah is the Best of Providers.” | ||
While Zawahiri remained critical of Hamas, he showered praises on Fatah al-Islam, the jihadist group that operated out of the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli, Lebanon. The group achieved fame within the jihadist community, and the world, during its widely publicized battle against the Lebanese army during the summer of 2007. Though jihadists cheered Fatah al-Islam, al-Qaeda’s leadership remained silent about the group, neither approving nor criticizing its actions.
Zawahiri’s interview represents the first time that the leadership of al-Qaeda publicly supported the group, as well as its leader, Shaker al-Absi. Zawahiri claimed that the reason for not outwardly supporting the group was that he did not want to create further problems for Fatah al-Islam by making others think the group was a part of al-Qaeda. Zawahiri noted that:
| >“The brothers in Fatah al-Islam were being accused by the agents of America of being a branch of al-Qaeda, and the brothers were denying that, so I feared that if I supported them openly, I would cause difficulties for them at a time when we were unable to extend to them a helping hand.” | ||
Despite Zawahiri’s claim that he did not want to create more trouble for Fatah al-Islam, it is also possible that al-Qaeda did not extend its full support for the group because al-Qaeda was skeptical about whether the Fatah al-Islam was indeed ideologically-aligned with al-Qaeda. Regardless, these concerns, if they existed, were obviously addressed, as Zawahiri announced unabashedly:
| “I declare that the brothers in Fatah al-Islam are heroes of Islam, and we know nothing but every good thing about them, and they confronted the Crusader-Zionist coalition in Lebanon in the most honorable way, and what happened to them and the Muslims in Nahar al-Bared is a crime which won’t be forgotten, and from Allah help is sought.” | ||
As part of his first set of responses, Zawahiri chose to answer difficult, antagonistic questions, demonstrating his attempt to appeal to those who may lean towards al-Qaeda’s ideology, but disapprove of al-Qaeda’s tactics of wanton killing. Nevertheless, Zawahiri defended al-Qaeda’s violent ways, He furthermore clarified his stance on Hamas, being careful not to alienate potential supporters by taking pains to differentiate between his criticism of the Hamas leadership and the movement as whole, while calling on members of Hamas to force their leaders to repudiate any form of negotiation related to Palestine. His first-ever public expression of support for Fatah al-Islam, widely supported within the online jihadist community for its resistance against the Lebanese army, evidences Zawahiri’s close reading of the pulse of the jihadist movement and his attempt to ensure that al-Qaeda always seems in tune with jihadist trends.
Zawahiri, of course, discussed a variety of other issues in his responses, covering Iran, Iraq, North Africa, Pakistan, and the role of jihadists living in the West. Zawahiri’s discussions of these topics and others will be covered in future issues of inSITE.