The East Turkistan Islamic Movement: The Pre-eminent Threat to the Beijing Olympics

The pre-eminent threat to the Beijing Olympics stems from the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) located in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. ETIM headquarters is located in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, FATA, along the 1520 mile long rugged border separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. FATA has emerged as an international sanctuary for global and local jihadists today.[1]

The numerical strength of ETIM in FATA and in its adjacent province of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) is less than 40. However, ETIM is a lethal group for five main reasons.

First, ETIM is integrated with Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), a group under the direct influence of al Qaeda. Numerically a force of only about 2-300 fighters, al Qaeda itself is too weak to mount attacks. al Qaeda, the most lethal terrorist group in history, now operates through a number of groups. Two groups closest to al Qaeda that can attack inside China are ETIM/IJU and Tareek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Second, ETIM is not capable of surviving in FATA by itself. With only 40 fighters, ETIM is surviving in FATA because it has linked up with IJU, the breakaway faction of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Unlike IMU, which believes in operating in Central Asia, IJU believes in operating globally. IJU has attacked targets both in Uzbekistan and in Germany. ETIM has attacked targets in Xingjiang and beyond.

Islamic Jihad Union Fighters

Third, ETIM was established to create an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang. The avowed goal of ETIM has changed in the last five years. Under the influence of al Qaeda, ETIM began to believe in the global jihad agenda. Today, ETIM follows the philosophy of al Qaeda and respects Osama bin Laden. Such groups that believe in the global jihad agenda do not confine their targets to the territories that they seek to control. ETIM, for example, seeks to attack Chinese targets in Xingjiang, in other parts of China and globally.  ETIM has become like al Qaeda and IJU: ETIM presents a threat to Chinese as well as Western targets worldwide.

Fourth, IJU and ETIM have the capacity to conduct mass fatality attacks using home made explosives. Their favoured model of attack is suicide operations using TATP (Triacetone Triperoxide) or HMTD (Hexamethylene Triperoxide). Both TATP and HMDT can be manufactured from commercially available materials anywhere in China, including in Beijing. Although the number of operatives of IJU and ETIM combined is small (below 200), they are trained by al Qaeda to conduct low cost - high impact attacks using TATP and HMDT. ETIM’s key instructor was Abu Ubaidah al Masri, who died in late 2007. He was al Qaeda’s leader in Kunar Province and held the post of head of external operations at the time of his death.

Fifth, IJU and ETIM operating in FATA are protected by Pakistani Taliban leaders. With the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Omar declining in strength, the Pakistani Taliban groups located in FATA and NWFP have become prominent. Many of the Pakistani Taliban leaders have come together to form a platform for cooperation – the Tareek-e-Taliban (TTP). The main organizer of TTP, Beitullah Mahsud, is also close to both ETIM and IJU leaders. al Qaeda is using Beitullah Mahsud’s own group, the Taliban in South Waziristan, as the strike arm of al Qaeda. While IJU protects ETIM, the larger umbrella of protection both to IJU and ETIM is provided by TTP under Beitullah Mahsud.

The greatest threat to the Beijing Olympics thus stems from ETIM, IJU and TTP. To prevent attacks, it is essential for Beijing to develop a deeper understanding of the structures of each one of these groups, their operatives and their modus operandi. The current understanding of the authorities of China of these three groups is appreciably weak.

Members of the Turkestan Islamic Party

Source: Forum on www.cihaderi.net

The Chinese Threat Assessment

Terrorism is the most serious threat to the Beijing Olympics. Since the Black September Organization attack targeting Israeli athletes in the Munich Olympics in 1972, governments around the world have developed robust measures to protect the Olympic Games. An Olympic Command Centre supported by an Olympic Security Committee has been formed to implement the security strategy to protect the international venues which host the Olympics.

As is the tradition, the Olympic Security Committee has requested governments to post their representatives to Beijing to assess the threat to their Olympic teams as well as to the event itself. Most governments have posted or assigned representatives from their security and intelligence services. Their primary focus is on the terrorist threat to their athletes as well as to their VIPs.

The Olympic Security Committee in Beijing perceives a terrorist threat to the Olympic Games from four classes of groups. Based on several studies conducted by the Chinese government, the Chinese security and intelligence community perceive the threat to be from the following groups.[2]

1) al Qaeda,

2) East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

3) Tibetan Liberation Organization, and

4) Falun Gong Sect

Since the 1990s, China has not been an exception to the global rise of ethnicity and religiosity. Beijing has understood that maintaining cordial relations with ethnic and religious minorities will reduce the opportunity for ethnic separatism and religious extremism. Thus, Beijing’s strategy has been to co-opt these minorities. As it regards economic development to be the key in managing ethnic and religious conflict, Beijing has made significant economic investments in Xinjiang and in Tibet. Additionally, the need to respect the minorities has been publicly reiterated by leaders, including the current leadership in China.[3]

There is a view prevailing in the West that the Uighurs (the Turkish speaking Muslim minority in Xinjiang) were reduced to a minority in Xingjiang by deliberate colonization of Han Chinese. However, Beijing argues that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was dispatched to protect Chinese borders. Subsequently, the PLA played a very important role in the economic development of Xinjiang. Historically, the relations between the Uighurs and Beijing have been cordial. Although a segment of politicized Uighurs periodically rebelled against Beijing, it was a by-product of Uighur nationalism which manifested itself in acts of violence. Overall the relation between Xinjiang and Beijing has been good and is improving.

Today, the real threat from the conflict with the Uighurs stems not so much from nationalism but from religiosity. Uighurs have traveled to Pakistan and to Central Asia for terrorist and extremist training where they have been exposed to the movement of global jihad.

Following the US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance detained two dozen Uighurs. During their debriefings, the Uighurs said, “we have nothing against the US but we want to establish an independent Uighur country.” Citing China’s human rights record, the US transferred the Uighurs detained in Guantanamo Bay to Albania. In contrast, the US has not transferred any other Asian or Middle Eastern nationals captured fighting in Afghanistan to another country.

The Jihadist View of China

The most recent perception of China within the Jihadist community is shaped by Dr. Akram Hijazi, an influential Arab writer whose analysis appeals to both moderate and radical Islamists.[4] In a piece published on his personal blog in January 2007, Hijazi examines China through the lens of the Salafist-Jihadist movement, the ideology of al Qaeda. While it was published on his blog in January 2007, the analysis was not circulated on Jihadist websites until mid-August and September 2007.  The Arab world has a superficially friendly relationship with China, says Dr. Akram Hijazi.[5] Arabs appreciate the way that China stands up to the United States and challenges its hegemony. However, says Hijazi, this friendly relationship will likely come to an end when China usurps the title of the global hegemon. Hijazi claims that, like the United States before it, China will support Israel, bringing it into confrontation with Muslims.

Hijazi refers to the United States as “the head of the snake,” a term used by Osama bin Laden, and China as “the multi-headed dragon.”[6] He suggests that soon, “the multi-headed dragon [China] could replace the head of the snake [the US]” as a global hegemon at odds with the Islamic world.[7] Hijazi believes that beneath the façade of friendliness that has characterized China’s relations with the Arab world, “there is blatant hostility between Muslims and the Chinese.”[8] To support his argument, Hijazi examines China’s relationship with Israel, and determines that China is likely to maintain productive relations with Israel just like the United States has. He assumes that China will usurp the US as the global hegemon, and, based on his examination of the current state of Chinese-Israeli relations, asserts that, from this hegemonic position, China will continue to support Israel. Specifically, he draws attention to Israeli transfers of arms and weapons technology to China, and to the Chinese establishment of Jewish cultural centres in its major cities, as well as new programs for the study of Hebrew, Judaism, and Jewish culture at Beijing University.  Hijazi’s analysis could provide a clue of how the Jihadist movement is likely to react to China as China becomes a more powerful player in the international community.

The ETIM Strategy

In contemporary times, Muslim extremists of the Uighur region of China have been demanding a separate Islamic republic. Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of Uighur nationalist groups were founded with the goal of establishing an independent state of East Turkistan.[9] The most resilient of the groups to be established was the East Turkistan Islamic Movement,[10] also known as the East Turkistan Muslim Group,[11] East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah, East Turkistan Islamic Party, East Turkistan Opposition Party,[12] and the East Turkistan Islamic Hezbollah.

One of the best propaganda pieces produced by ETIM was in collaboration with al Qaeda. The video first illustrates a map of Eastern Turkistan before and after “the Chinese Communist State invaded their land and renamed it Xinjiang.” After an opening blessing, referring to Xinjiang as “a new colony,” the spokesperson of the video comments: “At the end of the Amawiyya Empire and the beginning of the Abbasid Empire at the third Hijrah Century in the year 232, Hijrah, Islam entered Turkistan and the Khakan Sultan and his family and all the leaders of the country became Muslims.”

The ETIM spokesman added:

The spokesperson added:

ETIM thus uses such propaganda to radicalize the Uighurs against China.

To attack the Chinese government, the ETIM strategy is two fold:

The first is to create a network of homegrown cells in China. By investing in anti-Chinese propaganda, ETIM plans to indoctrinate the Uighurs in Xinjiang, elsewhere in China, and globally to attack Chinese government interests. By adopting Abu Musab al Suri’s text “Invitation to World Islamic Resistance”, ETIM plans to copy the al Qaeda model of spawning homegrown cells in the West.  ETIM propaganda including an ETIM video produced jointly with Al Qaeda in November 2006 refers to Abu Musab al Suri’s writings.

The second strategy is to create dedicated ETIM units to infiltrate China and attack Chinese government targets in Xinjiang, other parts of China and globally. Its members undergoing training are masked, which shows that ETIM is planning for discrete missions. Instead of wasting its expertise, ETIM units trained by al Qaeda are likely to mount attacks.

The homegrown cells do not have the same level of expertise as the al Qaeda trained ETIM units. Instead of attacking Chinese government targets in Xinjiang or overseas, ETIM is more likely to choose high value, strategic and symbolic targets, such as the Beijing Olympics to gain world attention.

Turkistan Islamic Party burning a Chinese flag
Source: Forum on www.cihaderi.net

ETIM in FATA

The Taliban, the ruling regime in Afghanistan from 1996-2001, wanted to create the ideal Muslim community in the world. The Taliban therefore invited Islamic movements worldwide to bring their constituents to Afghanistan to build the perfect Muslim community.  At the invitation of the Taliban, ETIM arranged for the travel of Uighurs from Xinjiang to Afghanistan. In the White Mountains of Afghanistan near Jalalabad and the Pakistan border, ETIM built a village exclusively for the Uighurs.

In addition to a few hundred cadres trained in Xinjiang, ETIM had about 900-1000 Uighurs trained in camps in Afghanistan prior to 2001. They were mainly trained in Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif in basic military techniques, including weapons-handling, and guerrilla warfare tactics. [15] Although some reports claim that the Chinese authorities played up the threat of ETIM in order to provide a facade for its overall policy of quashing dissent in Xinjiang, the evidence that ETIM trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan is overwhelming.[16] Whilst the late ETIM leader Hasan Mahsum had denied any linkages with al-Qaeda or Osama bin-Laden, he did admit that some individual followers might have trained, or fought with al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan.[17] Three dozen members, including those trained, were detained in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the US-led coalition intervention in October 2001. Videos and photos of ETIM members armed with AK-47 assault rifles, automatic rifles, machine guns, dynamite and incendiary devices were recovered.  Safe houses in Afghanistan showed that they were engaged in the production of homemade bombs. According to the Chinese authorities, underground hideouts have been found in Xinjiang to contain anti-tank grenades, submachine guns, electric detonators, explosive devices, and equipment for making arms.

Today, ETIM is operating in FATA and the adjacent NWFP.  Hasan Mahsum relocated from Afghanistan to South Waziristan in late 2001 and early 2002. After Hasan Mahsum was killed on the tribal border, Haji Ali took over the group. Other groups that relocated included members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Chechens and members from the Moroccan and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Similarly, members of other North African groups, such as the Egyptian Gama’at al-Islamiyah, the Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group and Algerian militants, who were led by Abu Nasim al-Tunisi and Abu Sulayman al-Jaziri, settled in Peshawar in Pakistan. al-Qaeda has had relations with all of these groups and networks, in greatly varying degrees of intensity. (Before the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda had very close operational relations and strategic alignment with a range of groups. This included the Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group as well as parts of the Indonesian Jemaah al-Islamiyah and a faction of Egyptian Gama’at al-Islamiyah. However, due to effective security operations around the world in 2002 and 2003, the structure and reach of al-Qaeda’s leadership and those of the Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group and Hambali’s wing of Jemaah Islamiyah were weakened to an extent as to make cooperation difficult.)

The current deployment of different groups in FATA is as follows:

· Al-Qaeda - present in Mirali and Miranshah (Daur Tribe) areas of North Waziristan

· LIFG - present in Mirali and Miranshah areas of North Waziristan

· IJU - present in Mirali and Miranshah areas of North Waziristan

· IMU - leadership takes sanctuary in Mirali (North Wazirstan), Mahsud areas in South Waziristan; militants operate throughout FATA and some districts of NWFP

· ETIM - lives alongside IJU in Mirali (North Waziristan)

In FATA, al-Qaeda has relied on increased cooperation with Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and a faction of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), called Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). The IJU is led by the Uzbeks Nadzhmiddin Kamilidinovich Zhalov and Mansur Suhail. Their base is in North Waziristan and specifically in the Mir Ali area, from which they direct their group’s operations in Pakistan, Central Asia and Europe. ETIM is integrated with IJU – they live and train together.

IJU was the first global jihad group to use female-suicide bombers and the group has targeted both local and international targets in Uzbekistan and Europe, most significantly in three suicide attacks against the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek General Prosecutor’s office in Tashkent on 30 July 2004. In September 2007 the German authorities arrested three individuals who were members of a cell that had contact with the IJU.  They were led by a 28-year old German convert, Fritz Gelowicz, who had changed his name to Abdallah after converting to Islam. During the arrest operations the German authorities confiscated around 700 litres of 35% Hydrogen-Peroxide, which is a typical ingredient in Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) designed by bomb makers who learned their tradecraft in FATA.

ETIM also learnt the use of concentrated Hydrogen-Peroxide in IEDs. According to the German authorities, the arrestees were intending to build multiple IEDs from the 700 litres of Hydrogen-Peroxide and use them against a U.S. Army base and Uzbek consular facilities in Germany. Almost all the group members had been to training camps in North Waziristan. Fritz Gelowicz had visited Waziristan in March 2006 and subsequently continued to keep in contact with the IJU through his friend, Atilla Selek, who stayed and was arrested in Turkey in November 2007.  Shortly after the arrests in September, IJU posted a statement on the Internet, where the group acknowledged that they were indeed connected to the arrests in Germany.  A large number of individuals are still been sought for arrest in this case, including the leader of the IJU, Nadzhmiddin Kamilidinovich Zhalov.

Although based in FATA, not all groups completely share al-Qaeda’s vision and mission. Whereas IJU and ETIM have augmented their local ambitions with the global vision of al-Qaeda, the main goal of the other Uzbek movement, the IMU, remains the local Jihad in Central Asia. Due to the divergent interests of the three groups, there exists competition between al-Qaeda, IMU, and IJU/ETIM over access to resources, in particular rare commodities like money, weapons and safe-houses in Iranian Baluchistan, through which all three groups move cadres for training in FATA.

ETIM Members handling weapons at a training camp
Source: Forum on www.cihaderi.netmembers

Commenting on a rift in the relationship between Arabs and Central Asians, an official from Pakistan’s Inter-Services-Intelligence Directorate (ISI), who requested anonymity, said:

Increasingly, ETIM and IMU have started to operate independently. While it was hard to get Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens and Uighurs, who had been captured by the Pakistani Army in South Waziristan, to provide information on their compatriots, they were more willing to provide information on Arabs in the Agency.  Despite the rift with the IMU, al-Qaeda still managed to turn parts of South Waziristan into a hub for its operations in Afghanistan. During this period, al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan were led by Nashwan Abdulrazaq Abdulbaqi (alias Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi). Abd al-Hadi is a former officer in Saddam Hussein’s Army, who gave-up his Baathist leanings and joined the mujahideen, fighting the Soviet Army in Afghanistan during the late 1980s. During the 1990s he rose inside al-Qaeda’s hierarchy and later became head of al-Qaeda’s military forces in the Kabul area and a member of al-Qaeda’s ruling Majlis al-Shurra. Abd al-Hadi and Ammar al-Ruqa’i (alias Abu Layth al-Libi), worked mainly from bases in Shakai Valley in South Waziristan Agency and from Sedgi in the Shawal Valley in North Waziristan Agency of FATA. ETIM and IJU operated with al Qaeda during this period.

al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan were conducted under the overall leadership of Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Umar. Abd al-Hadi conducted attacks in Northeastern Afghanistan, most likely including Nuristan, Konar and Nangahar, while Abu Layth al-Libi commanded al-Qaeda attacks in Southeastern Afghanistan, most likely only encompassing Khost, Paktia,Zabul and Paktika. Abu Layth al-Libi is one of the leading members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), but with the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, LIFG members declared an oath of allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and members of the LIFG subsequently fought as part of al-Qaeda’s Internal Operations Structure, while maintaining their independence on External Operations. ETIM and IJU benefited from the training conducted by Abu Layth al Libi until he was killed in early 2008. Today, both ETIM and IJU are benefiting from the ideological training of Abu Yahiyah al Libi.

Conclusion

Measures against domestic and international terrorism at the Olympics depend on four aspects. First, a comprehensive global database; second, access to sound and timely global intelligence; third, international partnerships; and fourth, a capable strike force.

As the leadership of ETIM is based in Pakistan’s FATA, China’s all weather partnership with Pakistan has helped China to fight terrorism. In spite of the reluctance of the US to assist, China is building its counter terrorism capabilities with Israeli assistance.  Professionalism of the Hong Kong Police Force, especially its security wing, has helped China. While cooperating with international partners, the Chinese approach to counter terrorism is to build its own tactical and intelligence capabilities. In addition, China has worked with regional and international partners. Since its formation in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (a regional grouping comprising China, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) has agreed to work closely in fighting Muslim separatism and extremism. This included the setting up of a regional counter-terrorism centre and an anti-terrorism centre in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.[18] In January 2004, the SCO established a permanent Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure based in Uzbekistan. In August 2002, the Beijing government claimed that the US had evidence of plots to attack the US embassy and other public areas in Kyrgyzstan, and following that up in September, the Chinese pressured the US to list ETIM as a terrorist organization.  The Bush Administration subsequently announced that it would freeze the group’s assets in the US.[19] On 12 September 2002, ETIM was listed as a terrorist organization by the US Treasury Department.  In addition, China pushed for the inclusion of the group on the UN list of global terrorist organizations on 11 September 2002, and put three identified terrorists on Interpol red notices. The Chinese government claimed then that ETIM had killed 166 people and injured 440.[20]

In the last five years, with al Qaeda training ETIM members both in terrorist tactics and the conduct of propaganda, ETIM itself has come to resemble al Qaeda. In the coming months and years, ETIM will adopt al Qaeda’s operational practices such as suicide attacks and targeting high profile events. As al Qaeda’s ability to operate in China is limited, al Qaeda could prepare ETIM teams to infiltrate and attack China. As such, the principal threat to the Olympics will not come from Al Qaeda but by ETIM. As ETIM members are familiar with the operational environment, ETIM poses a much more serious threat to China than al Qaeda. In the lead up to the Olympics all measures should be taken to screen Uighurs who have traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Due to the growing alliance between al Qaeda and ETIM, the threat of a terrorist attack on the Beijing Olympics is medium.

Abu Sayaff Group, Jemaah Islamiyah and other Southeast Asian or South Asian or Central Asian groups do not pose an appreciable threat to the Olympics. They are strong nationally and cannot strike in Northeast Asia. Similarly, none of the Middle Eastern groups pose a threat to the Beijing Olympics.  The threat to the Olympics from al Qaeda, Tibetan Liberation Organization and Falun Gong is small compared to the threat by ETIM. Considering its close and continuing association with al Qaeda, the ETIM capabilities to strike China should not be under-estimated.

In the longer term, the threat to China will come from both within and outside. While transnational groups, especially those based in tribal Pakistan, will present an enduring threat, a more widespread homegrown threat will emerge from within China. In China, there are three communities that are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment and infiltration. As terrorists and extremists have penetrated Uighur, Hui and Muslim resident communities in Hong Kong, special attention should be paid to these communities and regions. Recent reporting by the intelligence community indicates that segments of these communities have been radicalized. Of security interest are groups, including extremist and terrorist groups, who have recruited or infiltrated these Chinese and migrant communities. Despite measures to protect itself from terrorism, China will face an appreciable threat in the lead-up, during and after the Olympics.