The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and its militant wing, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), exploited the recent 
violence in Urumqi in China on July 5, 2009 by issuing a statement on July 9, 2009 accusing China of “genocide” of the Uighur Muslims. ETIM propaganda claimed that the Chinese government killed “more than 1000,” wounded a “number that exceeded 2000,” and “dumped in prison more than 2000.” Furthermore, Seyfullah, TIP’s military commander, threatened the Chinese by saying: “Know that this Muslim people have men who will take revenge for them. Soon, the horsemen of Allah will attack you, Allah willing. So lie in wait; indeed, we lie in wait with you.”
Mounting ethnic clashes between local Uighurs Muslims and Han Chinese settlers in the capital of western China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region on Sunday, July 5, 2009, killed a total of 197 and maimed and injured over 1700. Although three quarter of the dead were Han Chinese, propaganda by ETIM and other Uighur separatist groups, including the Washington D.C.-based World Uighur Congress, attacked Beijing’s discrimination against the Uighurs. Most Turkic-speaking Uighurs, with a population of 9 million in Xinjiang, live in harmony with the dominant Han ethnic group, but the riots damaged the social fabric of Xinjiang. A minority of the politicized Uighurs accuse Beijing of repressing their faith, language, and culture, and discriminating against them by reserving all the best jobs for the migrant Han.
The riot in Xinjiang, the worst in China since 1949, is likely to remain a continuing source of instability. Although China’s communist mindset precludes her from reviewing and changing its policies towards the Tibetans, Uighurs, and other groups, China understands the complex challenge it faces in managing its minorities. When the riots broke out, the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, who was overseas attending the G8 Summit in Italy, grasped its seriousness and returned home on July 8 to personally take charge of the situation. Ethnic and religious violence, especially terrorism, will be the biggest national challenge to China in the coming years. As Wu Shimin, the vice minister of China's State Ethnic Affairs Commission says, the protesters who caused the violence in Urumqi were not motivated by economic factors. Very rightly, Wu says the riot was perpetrated by what Beijing calls the “three forces of evil”: extremism, terrorism, and separatism.
The Context
A troubled province with sporadic terrorist attacks, Xinjiang is 45% indigenous Uighur and 40% Han settlers. Of the 47 ethnic groups in Xinjiang, Uighurs are the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, but in Urumqi, Han make up more than 70 percent of the 2.3 million residents. Uighurs resent the Han settlements by the government, making the Uighurs a minority in some areas of their traditional home. China’s 55 recognized minorities account for about 8% of China’s 1.3 billion people. The other 92% are Han, including those who dominate the central government.
Like Tibet, Xinjiang is an autonomous region in China. Among other irritants, Beijing’s policy of settling Han Chinese in Xinjiang has been a source of tension between the native Uighur community and the government for years. Politicized Uighur claim that Han moved into Xinjiang to exploit its oil, natural gas, and agricultural resources as part of Beijing's “develop the West” policy. There is concern and fear that the Uighurs will soon be marginalized in their native territory. Despite China economically developing Xinjiang into one of the most productive regions of the country, a minority of the Uighurs resent Beijing’s assimilation and integration policy. The support and sympathy from the Uighurs to the separatist movement in Xinjiang has grown significantly during the last decade. The Chinese authorities periodically detain Uighurs that support separatism. In the lead up to the Olympics, the authorities arrested and tried more than 1,100 people in Xinjiang during a campaign against what they called “religious extremists and separatists.” Shortly after the arrests, Wang Lequan, the region’s Communist Party secretary, described the crackdown as a “life and death” struggle. The majority of the Uighur Muslims are moderate and tolerate, but both the influences from neighboring Pakistan and the developments in Afghanistan continue to radicalize a segment of the Uighurs.
Ethnically akin to Central Asians, the Uighurs voice concerns of discrimination, a charge denied by the government. Beijing claim minorities have greater benefits than the Han, such as permission to have more than one child. Although there are 23,000 mosques to practice Islam, just over half the civil servants come from minorities. Nonetheless, the government places restrictions on the practice of Islam and bans practicing Muslims from most government jobs. Most Han employees in Xinjiang prefer not to employee Uighurs; they consider them “trouble.” Even outside Xinjiang, the Han regarded Uighurs as untrustworthy, aggressive, and inclined towards crime. Increasingly, the Han believes that Uighurs are linked to international terrorism. Although neither is true, the perception is creating a gulf between these two communities damaging the prospect of future peace.
The propaganda by both violent and non-violent Uighur separatist groups including TIP/ETIM (which is associated with al-Qaeda), is driving this hatred and fuelling the anger. ETIM was responsible for a series of bombing both in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China in the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics. To create an environment of insecurity, Seyfullah, the military commander of TIP said before the Olympics, “Bomb the Chinese government buildings, military barracks, airplanes, airports, railways, foreigner hotels, entertainment venues, tourist spots and similar places! Set on fire! You are even permitted to use biological weapons this time.”
The ETIM leadership, located in Waziristan on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, is out of China’s reach. Having received training, weapons, finance, and ideology from al-Qaeda, ETIM members have transformed. They attack not only China but fight both the Pakistani security forces in tribal Pakistan and the Afghan security forces in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda-trained ETIM suicide bombers present a growing threat both to coalition forces in Afghanistan and to China’s stability and security. Al-Qaeda ideologues have argued that after the defeat of the existing superpower, the US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the next enemy of the Muslims will be the multi-headed dragon, a reference to China, the emerging superpower. In addition to ETIM, a dozen Uighur separatist groups in the US, Canada, and Europe are radicalizing the Uighur communities in China. Some of these groups with terrorist links have been able to influence the US and other Western governments to release the Uighur detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.
The Background
The background to the riots in Urumqi on July 5, 2009, can be traced back to a group of Uighurs that gathered to demand an inquiry into the June 26 fight between Han and Uighur workers in the Xuri Toy Factory in south China's Guangdong Province. Located in the mountainous areas of Shaoguan, northwest of Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong, the factory that makes dolls, electronic-game consoles, and other toys, mainly for export, employs 18,000 workers, including China’s minorities. The factory is owned by Hong Kong-listed Lacewood International, which started making toys and handbags in 2007. The Uighurs' employment at the toy plant was a labor program promoted by the government to help provide the demand for labor and to build bonds between Uighurs and Han workers. As the economic delta of China encompass the triangle of Macau, Hong Kong and Guangzhou, it employs about 1.5 million workers from ethnic minorities in Guangdong Province, the epicenter of the world’s biggest factory.
As Huang Cuiling, a 19 year old Han girl accidentally entered a dormitory for Uighur men at 11 pm on June 25, an unintentional scream triggered a rumor that a Han girl was raped by Uighur workers. She was a trainee with only a couple of months on the job. A malicious rumor that six Uighurs raped two Han women triggered the violence in the early morning of June 26. Although the press reported that the fight in the factory left two dead and 118 injured, some claim that more were killed. After the television in Hong Kong reported the event, the international media as well as the Uighur groups (including the separatist organizations) highlighted the loss of life and injury. The fight in the factory documented in the form of a video was posted on YouTube with the title “Chinese Commies Massacre Innocent Uyghur Workers 3,” and a caption saying it shows Han Chinese with clubs beating Uighurs as they try to flee. A rallying event, an Internet posting by a disgruntled former worker said: "Six Xinjiang boys raped two innocent girls at the Xuri Toy Factory."
In the early hours of July 5, the police in Urumqi received a tip that there were calls on Internet forums for demonstrations. Furthermore, text messages from members of the World Uighur Congress in the US to their support groups in Urumqi incited hatred and instigated the unrest. China claims that the riot was masterminded by anti-China elements abroad that called for their supporters in China to be braver and to do something big, but did not present evidence. Nur Bekri, the governor of Xinjiang said: “Rebiya had phone conversations with people in China on July 5 in order to incite, and websites such as Uighurbiz.cn and Diyarim.com were used to orchestrate the incitement and spread of propaganda.” Government responded to the events by taking steps to counter the propaganda, but it was too slow. To prevent another riot, the government also relocated the Uighur workers to another factory.
The violence in Xinjiang came as a few hundred Uighurs staged a sit down protest in the People’s Square in downtown Urumqi after work. The unarmed protesters wanted an inquiry into the June 25 deaths of Uighur factory workers in southern China. The protest was peaceful at the beginning, but the moment the police arrived and demanded that the protesters disperse, it broke out into violence around 8 p.m. When the police attempted to disperse the crowd, they broke through the police lines. Except for battons, the police on duty were not carrying weapons. As the protesters threw rocks and bricks and also started to fight the policemen with sticks, two policemen were killed and at least 30 police cars were damaged or burned. The rioters scattered throughout Urumqi, attacking Han pedestrians, smashing buses, burning cars, and smashing Han windows. The spasm of attacks by Muslim Uighurs against Han Chinese and the counterattacks, soon spread to other downtown areas. While the Uighur were joined by better armed Uighur mobs, Han mobs gathering on sidewalks with kitchen knives, clubs, shovels and wooden poles and started attacking Muslim businesses and homes. The fighting continued into the night. The next day, the government reported the death toll to be at least 140, the injured 828. The government also claimed that 261 motor vehicles, including 190 buses and at least 10 taxis, were burned and 203 shops and 14 homes were destroyed. As retaliatory attacks continued, the death toll continued to rise to 129 men and 27 women killed and 1080 injured. The Chinese prevented the spread of the riot to Kashgar, the historic silk road city 1,600 km southwest of Urumqi. Kashgar, another venue for terrorist and extremist recruitment, is near Pakistan, the gateway to Afghanistan. At about 5:15 p.m. on Monday, 200-300 protesters gathered at China’s largest mosque, Kashgar’s Id Kah. Soon after, armed police rushed to the scene and explained the events in Urumqi to the crowd at 6 p.m.
Contrary to China’s traditional response of overreaction, this time the Chinese response was measured and well targeted. Instead of mobilizing the military, the Urumqi local government and Beijing rushed armed police to the scene. The police fought the rioters—both Uighur and Han—and imposed a curfew and ordered people to remain at home. To prevent public gatherings, the government ordered even mosques to remain closed for the coming days. When police detained 1,400 Uighur men, the women took to the streets. As Uighurs felt that their ethnic community was singled out and treated unfairly by the authorities, the Uighurs became defiant. Sporadic protests to free those detained by the authorities continued.
The Uighur separatists—who do not consider Xingjiang to be a part of China—have their own skewed interpretation of events. Seeking to politicize, radicalize, and mobilize the Uighurs both in China and overseas, TIP spread their version of history, claiming that in the first place, the Chinese had forced Uighurs to leave their homeland of Xingjiang and travel to “China” for work. In the electronic factory, where the fight took place, TIP claimed that a simple argument led to a fight between 600 Uighurs and 6000 “Chinese” workers who were also supported by the public. TIP claimed that the “Chinese” police stood by the “Chinese” and 200 were killed and 400 wounded. The government, TIP accused, did not bring the perpetrators to justice. This led to fierce Urumqi fighting, but once again TIP stated that the police stood on the side of the Chinese. Although there could have been a few cases of a Han policeman siding with a Han mob, the police as an institution would not be so blatant. In Xingjiang, a significant proportion of the policemen are from minorities, especially Uighur. By such propaganda, TIP seeks to create the impression that the police seek only to protect the Han while TIP (and its armed wing ETIM) is fighting for the rights of the Uighurs.
Aftermath of the Violence
Tens of thousands of security forces deployed to end the deadly clashes between Uighurs and Han remaining in Xinjiang. The authorities continued to arrest both Uighur and Han over the rioting. Despite the might of Chinese power, Beijing and its local representatives were not able to restore security and stability in Xingjiang until three weeks after the start of the riots. The Chinese government prevented the main market in Urumqi from reopening until July 22, 2009. Under the watchful eyes of the Chinese authorities, China gradually eased the restrictions in Xingjiang. Both in Xingjiang and overseas, Uighur groups and individuals continued to campaign for those detained during and after the riots.
To stabilize Xinjiang, the authorities doubled the amount of compensation that is paid to the families of innocent civilians killed to nearly $62,000. However, on the ground the authorities did not adopt a conciliatory attitude essential to building the bridges between the Uighurs and Han. “To those who have committed crimes with cruel means, we will execute them,” Li Zhi, the top Communist party official in Urumqi said. Urumqi’s Public Security Bureau issued a wanted poster with 15 names, 14 Uighur and one Han, on July 30, 2009. In typical Chinese style, the poster urged the suspects to turn themselves in within 10 days and they would be dealt with with “leniency” and those who refuse to surrender will be dealt with “severely.” Similar to its approach to Tibet, Beijing warned lawyers to stay away from cases in Xinjiang, suggesting that those who assist anyone accused of rioting pose a threat to national unity.
As Uigur groups overseas exploited the fallout of the riot, the Chinese government remained tough. For instance, a police van announced in the Uighur language to the public to oppose activist Rebiya Kadeer, the 62-year-old Uighur businesswoman in the US who Beijing accused of instigated the riots. Rebiya, emerging as an icon of resistance against Beijing, has not directly called for violence. However, Rebiya’s global campaign for linguistic and cultural autonomy of Uighurs has made them more aware of their rights and increasingly bold. Despite China’s protests, Rebiya continued to travel from her base in Washington D.C., including to neighboring Japan, highlighting the deteriorating security in Xingjiang. An angry Chinese official said: “This f**ing woman wants to be the Dalai Lama of Xingjiang.” Annoyed with her US backing, the Chinese official added: “The CIA is supporting her.”
While a few countries expressed concern, most countries considered the developments in Xingjiang an internal affair of China.
China’s economic might has suppressed any criticism from the governments of the developing world except Turkey, a country with cultural ties to Uighurs. Earning the anger of China, Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, described the violence as “a kind of genocide”. In Central Asia, another region where Uighurs live in substantial number, many Muslim organizations and individuals expressed unhappiness. In some countries such as Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, there were campaigns to protest demonstrations. The Chinese capacity to counter the propaganda, especially in the West where Uighur groups had established diaspora organizations, was limited. There were few effective articles such as, “What Europe should understand about the violence in Urumqi” by the Chinese ambassador to the EU, Song Zhe, rebutting distorted reports by the European media. China was unprepared to fight the diplomatic and media campaign.
Implications of the Riot
The riot is a huge victory for Uighur separatists, particularly for TIP/ETIM. They have a ready support and sympathizer base to recruit, raise funds, generate intelligence, etc. Benefitting from the suffering, anger, and resentment of the Uighurs, TIP/ETIM and other separatist groups are likely to grow over time. Support for separatism is likely to move from the periphery to the center. Both in China and overseas, the Uighur separatist movement will become embolden. Over time, the Uighur separatist movement is likely to exceed the scale of activity of the Tibetans.
Drawing from this vast reservoir of support, TIP/ETIM is likely to take a trajectory of its own. Despite its close relationship with al-Qaeda, TIP/ETIM has been careful not to attack the US. This has been largely because of the US position on the Uighur detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Instead of returning the 22 Uighurs captured in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2001-2 to China, the US found countries such as Bermuda, Albania and Palau to accept them. The Uighur separatists viewed their lobbying campaign, including in Washington, DC where they had built multiple platforms,to be a success. If Uighur detainees were released to China, Beijing may have executed them. Nonetheless, TIP has started to show displeasure against the US only after Washington, D.C. designated TIP leader Abdul Haq as a Specially Designated Foreign Terrorist on April 20, 2009. TIP claimed that the designation by the US was meant to please China and win economic, political, and military support. Although TIP/ETIM has not directly targeted US interests until now, it is likely that TIP/ETIM will move in that direction in the future. TIP’s official magazine, “Islamic Turkistan” claimed that the US is seeking to “intensify Chinese efforts against TIP in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region where some TIP members are located. TIP has already expressed unhappiness over the Chinese-Pakistani security cooperation that led nine Uighurs to be arrested in Pakistan and handed over to China. TIP threatened any country that delivers TIP member to China. Although TIP/ETIM members number only a few dozen, it is likely that ETIM will mount attacks against US and Pakistani interests in the near future. After China, its tier one target, the TIP/ETIM views Pakistan and the US as its enemies.
The Future
Xingjiang is China’s new flashpoint. In terms of containment and restoring stability, Xingjiang will present a greater challenge than Tibet. Bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, Xingjiang is both geo-political and geo-strategic. As threats are increasingly transnational, Beijing will have to take extra care to secure Xingjiang and build counterterrorism partnerships with its neighbors.
The US politicized the global fight against terrorism when it refused the Chinese government’s request to extradite the Uighur terrorists in US custody. The Uighur terrorists, captured in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2001-2, were operating both with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Citing human rights abuse, the US has released the Uighur detainees to other countries. Instead of remaining divided, the US and China should build a partnership to fight the global threat of terrorism and extremism. The US should invite the Chinese to contribute its forces to Iraq and to Afghanistan to restore stability and security in these two defining conflict zones.
Although Beijing’s military might is capable of countering the threats from the neighborhood, it has limitations of ideologically countering the virulent ideologies affecting its citizens. Beijing’s existing capabilities are not suitable for restoring long term stability in Xingjiang. To meet the challenge of Xingjiang after the July violence, Beijing will need to invest even more in economically developing Xingjiang and empowering the mainstream Uighur community. In addition to repairing the broken bridges and building new ones, Beijing will need to win over the Uighurs who resent the Han settlers. Beijing and its representatives in Xingjiang also must work with Xingjiang’s community and religious leaders to build social resilience. The Chinese government needs to build a norm and an ethic in the communities of Xingjiang against extremism and its by vicious byproduct—violence.
Conclusion
Today, 70-80% of all the world’s conflicts are ethno-political or politico-religious. The ethnic and religious conflict zones produce human suffering, virulent ideologies, internal displacement, refugee flows, as well as terrorists and extremists. China needs to study how best other countries have both successfully managed and failed to manage ethnic and religious tensions. China needs to craft a long term policy to control and mitigate the emerging and existing drivers of separatism.
Violence in Xingjiang, ETIM, and Uighur separatist movement will remain on the top of the Chinese agenda in the coming months and years. Despite efforts by Beijing to restore peace, the episodic violence between ETIM and the government and Uighurs and Han communities is likely to spread beyond Xingjiang. Unfortunately, the Chinese hardline approach towards Uighur separatists fails to differentiate between terrorists, supporters and sympathizers. Instead of investing in community engagement initiatives to build broken bridges between Uighurs and Han, the Chinese government has detained several thousand protestors, creating a tit-for-tat mentality.
Today, China suffers from unrest both in Tibet and Xingjiang. Its policies to manage these sensitive areas have been unsuccessful. Continuity of unrest in Tibet and Xingjiang will be an irritant to China’s steady progress. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the situation in Tibet sparked the violence in Xingjiang. Despite the overbearing attitude of Beijing towards Tibet, the Tibetan movement for autonomy remains untainted with violence and confined to non-violent protests. As such, there is no direct connection between the protests in Tibet and the violence in Xingjiang. Nonetheless, it is very likely that one may continue to influence the other in the future.
If there is greater radicalization of the Uighur communities both in China and overseas, the Uighur and Tibetan communities may work together, starting outside of China. Like the Tibetan exile groups, the Uighur exile groups are becoming better organized. Although the Dalai Lama personally is unlikely to encourage such a union, his successors may decide on joint protests and even joint action. Beijing’s short term approach of being unwilling to speak to mainstream leaders such as the Dalai Lama reflects its lack of understanding of managing ethnic and religious communities.
For China, this riot is a major blow to its reputation and prestige. At a strategic level, the riot demonstrated that China’s approach to managing minorities has been a failure. Despite efforts to recognize and empower minorities economically, China’s approach has not dampened the cry for cultural and religious freedoms. Interactions between Han Chinese and the Tibetans and Uighurs living on the country's western frontier can be especially fraught. The government, in an attempt to quell resentment among Uighurs and Tibetans, has poured development money into the West to create jobs and economic growth.
Although most officials are unwilling to revisit China’s failed policy on managing minorities, the country will have to rethink of its approach to minorities. Both Tibet before the Beijing Olympics and now Xinjiang have suffered riots, reflecting a general failure on the part of the Chinese to manage ethnic politics. A few understand it, but only very few are willing to talk about it openly. Wang Yang, Guangdong’s powerful Communist party leader close to President Hu Jintao, said: “We have to adjust to the actual situation. China is a multi-ethnic society..If adjustments are not made promptly, there will be some problems.
Professor Rohan Gunaratna is the head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He has visited Xingjiang.