Carnage in Mumbai: The World's Longest Terrorist Attack?

The vulnerability of cities worldwide to terrorism was highlighted when ten terrorists willing to kill and die brought India’s commercial and entertainment capital to its knees from November 26-29, 2008. Within two hours of landing in Mumbai, the terrorists seized landmark targets beginning a prolonged siege that would last three days. While Indian security forces failed to subdue the attackers and rescue the hostages during the first 60 hours, a world in shock watched the terrorists systematically kill 171, maim and injure 300, and damage and destroy ten targets.

Mumbai, India’s most vibrant city of 18 million people, have suffered previously from terrorism. However, this high-impact, media-grabbing, bloody attack was different in scale and magnitude. The terrorists selected high-profile, symbolic and iconic targets including Mumbai’s most luxurious hotels: the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower and the Oberoi Trident. To shock the world and to overwhelm emergency response, the attack was coordinated and near simultaneous. It was a mass-fatality, mass-casualty attack by terrorists willing to kill and to die. The attackers killed mostly Indian Hindus but singled out Westerners, particularly American, British and Israeli. A total of 26 foreigners were killed. Both the attack method of operation and target selection denoted a classic al-Qaeda attack. Although not perpetrated by Osama bin Laden's predominately Arab group, the attackers and their masterminds were certainly influenced by al-Qaeda's methodology and ideology of killing infidels in return for paradise.The attack demonstrated the lethality of the expanding geography of al-Qaeda influenced if not directed operations.

Taj Mahal Palace Hotel

Attack Plan 

A watershed attack in planning and style, the attacking group was innovative and the targeting was complex. Unlike most attacks conducted during the last two decades on Indian soil, the attackers that wreaked havoc in Mumbai were exceptionally well-trained and equipped with weaponry, GPS, satellite communications and forged Indian identity documents. The attackers were trained in close-combat techniques, hostage-taking, handling of explosives, satellite navigation, and high-seas survival.[1]They were highly motivated. It was a one-way mission. They did not intend to return.

To maintain operational security, during the training phase, the attackers did not know each other's identity. Until they left Karachi, the compartmentalized member units of the attacking teams did not communicate with each other. They travelled to their targets mostly on water. The mission began on November 23, 2008 in Karachi after they loaded a Pakistani boat with weapons, ammunition, and food. Close to Indian international water they hijacked Kuber, an Indian fishing boat.[2] Kuber, a 45-foot fishing boat with four Indian crew members, originated in Porbandar in Gujarat, India on November 13.After killing three of the four crew members and throwing them overboard, the terrorists threatened its remaining lead crew member Narayan Singh to navigate the vessel to Mumbai. An Indian coast guard helicopter spotted the Kuber adrift at sea on the afternoon of November 27. Kuber was carrying the throat slashed body of Narayan Singh bound and gagged on the boat’s floor.[4]

After reaching Mumbai on November 26, the terrorists used two inflatable dinghies to land on the southern tip of Mumbai at about 8.30 p.m.[5] After the first group of terrorists conducted a seaborne landing in Cuffe Parade, a second team landed at Colaba Coast. Wearing t-shirts and jeans, they carried backpacks containing weapons, explosives, communication equipment, and food. The two teams split into groups by target location.

They operated in pairs and struck ten targets, finally concentrating on two iconic hotels and a Jewish community centre.

CCTV footage and those who spotted the clean shaven teenagers saw them appear confident. The attackers had an intimate knowledge of the targets and law enforcement authorities. Ruthless and skilled, theydid not wish to waste any time until they reached the two hotels. They did not distinguish between Muslims and Hindus except when inside the five-star hotels.

WEDNESDAY 26 NOVEMBER

9:15 p.m. Two terrorists entered Café Leopold, a posh restaurant frequented by locals and foreigners, and began shooting at random. Most were backpackers. Many were watching India play cricket against England.

9:20 p.m. Two other terrorists approached Nariman House business and residential complex housing the Jewish Chabad Lubavitch outreach centre. One of the terorists threw a grenade at the nearby Bharat Petrolium gas station before entering the five-story Nariman House, a favoured destination of backpackers. After killing a Kosher food inspector, the terrorists took the rabbi, his wife, and five Israelis hostage and subsequently killed them. The two-year-old child of the couple survived.

9:24 p.m. Two terrorists entered Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST), Mumbai’s colonial era railway station. CST is one of the world’s busiest, handling thousands of passengers each day. The terrorists threw a grenade and randomly shot at passengers. As most unarmed policemen ran away, the terrorists killed 40 people, including three policemen.[6]

9:30 p.m. The two terrorists who attacked Café Leopold broke down a side door and entered the Taj Hotel. Two other terrorists entered the hotel through the front entrance and started to shoot and throw grenades. The guests at the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower hotel, a landmark of Mumbai since 1903, were held hostage for 60 hours. On November 26, there were 450 guests staying at the hotel.

9:35 p.m. After two terrorists killed the unarmed security guard and two bellhops at Oberoi Trident Hotel, they breached through the entrance and ran to the lobby firing at guests. After the terrorists shot dead a staff member at the Opium Den bar, they climbed the stairs and entered the Tiffin Restaurant killing guests. They took 16 diners to the 20^th floor and confiscated their phones. When questioned by a guest, “Why are you doing this to us? We haven’t done anything to you,” the terrorists responded “remember Babri Masjid,” the 16^th century mosque built by India’s first Mughal emperor and demolished by Hindu extremists in 1992 and “remember Godhra?”, where several tens of thousands of Muslims were killed by Hindu extremists in 2002.[7] Before shooting them at point blank range, the terrorists freed two Turks who claimed they were Muslim and took the rest hostage.[8] In a prolonged siege, the terrorists, who had by then established a command centre, systematically killed both the hotel guests and visitors and fought Indian security forces attempting to hunt them down and free the hostages. On November 26, there were 380 guests staying at the hotel.

9:55 p.m. A taxi used by the terrorists exploded in Viliparle, a suburb of Mumbai.

10:15 p.m. Two terrorists who attacked the train terminal entered the Cama Hospital. After killing unarmed guards, they killed one policeman who confronted them. In an alley separating Cama from the GT hospital, the terrorists fired at a police SUV, killing Mumbai’s anti-terrorism chief and two senior officials.

10:30 p.m. From the police vehicle comandeered by the terrorists, they fired at bystanders near the Metrocinama, a complex of movie theatres. Another police vehicle gave chase. The terrorists abandoned the police vehicle and hijacked a Skoda.

10:50 p.m. At a police road block at Chowpatty beach, the Soka attempted to turn back but the vehicle got stuck at on the median.[9] While the policemen shot the terrorist driver, the remaining terrorist got out of the vehicle killing one officer and injuring the other. However, the remaining policemen overpowered him.

THURSDAY 27 NOVEMBER

The stand off continued at the hotels and the Jewish community centre. Indian marine commandos responded but were not prepared for a hotel hostage rescue operation. A large fire broke out at the Taj Hotel and an hour later authorities begin escorting people out of the hotel.

FRIDAY 28 NOVEMBER

Gun fire and explosions are witnessed from both the Taj and Oberoi hotels.

7:30 a.m. Commandos repelled from helicopters on to Nariman House killing terrorists.

11:00 a.m. Commandos killed the two terrorists and took full control of the Oberoi hotel and release remaining hostages.

3:00 p.m. Mumbai police report that five hostages inside the Jewish centre have been found shot dead.

SATURDAY 29 NOVEMBER

4:30 a.m. Renewed explosions and gunfire are heard from inside the Taj Hotel.

7:30 a.m. Fire breaks out on the lower floors of the Taj Hotel.

8:50 a.m. Mumbai police declare the Taj Mahal siege over, with the deaths of three gunmen.

The Enduring Threat

India has a long history of suffering from and fighting terrorism and insurgency. Nonetheless, the Mumbai attacks took India by surprise. Mumbai itself has been the venue of major terrorist incidents. In 1993, over 300 Indians were killed when terrorists attacked the Bombay Stock Exchange Building, Hotel Sea Rock, Hotel Centaur, Juhu, Hotel Centaur, Santa Cruz, Plaza Cinema, Shiv Sena Bhawan, Zaveri Bazaar, the area opposite of Century Bazaar, Passport Office, Air India Building, Sahar Airport, Plaza Theatre, Dadar.

The government was ill-prepared to meet the terrorist challenge. The anti-terrorism units of Mumbai and the Indian marine commandos were not familiar with the hotel layout. The commandos of the National Security Guard (NSG) had no presence in Mumbai. There was no proper response action plan in place either in Mumbai or nationally. When the terrorists attacked Mumbai, its Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh was in Kerala, another Indian state. By the time he grasped the situation and informed Home Minister Shivraj Patil an hour had passed by. As there was no aircraft in New Delhi that could transport 200 NSG commandos to Mumbai, the IL 76 had to be flown from Chandigarh. By the time the commandos landed at Mumbai airport, boarded the waiting buses, and received a briefing and dispatched on their mission it was 6:00 a.m. the next day. Nine valuable hours had passed. Both Indian and US intelligence agencies had informed the government of the general threat to Mumbai but the authorities did not take the threat seriously enough to prevent or prepare for the attack.

India has claimed that the operation was staged by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a local Pakistani group from mainland Pakistan. At this point in time,

it is not known if al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban recruited, retrained and directed individual members of Pakistani and other groups to mount the Mumbai attack. It is also not known whether the attackers received training in tribal Pakistan and came under the influence or direction of groups controlled by al-Qaeda or by al-Qaeda directly.

The only terrorist captured in Mumbai, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, is the son of Mohammed Amir Kasab from Faridkot village in Okaada district of Punjab Province, Pakistan. The 21-year-old, poorly-educated Pakistani joined Lashkar-e-Taiba two years ago and underwent one and half years of initial training at various LeT training camps, but principally in Musafrabad, Kashmir, in Pakistan. According to Nic Robertson of CNN who spoke to Mumbai Joint Police Commissioner of Crime Rakesh Maria who is leading the Mumbai investigation: “Kasab was given small arms training, automatic weapons training, explosives training, survival training, nautical training. The last three months of his training was specific to the Mumbai attack. This is true for the other gunmen although they didn’t know each others mission and the training varied dependent on the targets. Kasab was shown photographs of the locations he was to target. The train station, the hospital etc. At each location he was told things like you’ll come in through this door, then go over here, then go out through that door, very very detailed explicit instructions. The gunmen were hand picked, but there were no examinations per say. While in the camps they all had code names.”[10]

What is known is that both LeT and Pakistani Taliban had conducted hostage-taking operations and al-Qaeda had trained for such operations. For instance, when LeT attacked a camp of the Central Reserve Police Force in Srinagar, during the counter attack operatives retreated to a hotel and took hostages. The hotel stand-off continued. Both LeT and Jaysh-e-Muhammad (JeM) have staged fedayeen attacks. Fedayeen attacks are “no surrender” attacks in which the perpetrators come with the full intention to kill and die. Like the Mumbai attackers, they carry high-caliber weapons and grenades and kill indiscriminately.

The only occasion a Pakistani group targeted Westerners in India was in Pahalgam, Southern Kashmir, when al-Faran took nine hostages on July 4, 1995. Believed to be a breakaway faction of Harakat-ul Ansar (now renamed Harakat-ul Mujahideen) released three women and one old man. The six western tourists held included two Americans, two British, one German, and one Norwegian. While one of the captives escaped, the Norwegian was beheaded on the ninth day of captivity. The perpetrators then demanded the release of terrorists in custody. In December 1995, the Indian government mounted an operation to rescue the captives.

In 1996, a terrorist in captivity, Nazir Ahmed, said that the five hostages were killed and buried in southern Kashmir’s Manigam. To free Pakistani terrorists in Indian jails, the Pakistani group Jaysh-e-Muhammad hijacked Indian Airlines Flight 814 from Nepal to New Delhi on December 24, 1999. The hijackers killed one hostage and eventually India released Maulana Masud Azhar, Mushtaq Zargar, and Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheik. The latter, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, was incarcerated in India after planning to kidnap Westerners. The association between Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheik and al-Qaeda subsequently led to the killing in Karachi of Daniel Pearl, the first American to be killed after 9-11.

Threat groups in Pakistan and Bangladesh have extensive links to groups in India. In the recent past, most terrorist attacks in India have been staged by the Indian Mujahideen, a group with extensive links to Harakat-ul Jihad-e-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and Muslim groups in Pakistan. An email sent by the Indian Mujahideen a few months before the Mumbai attacks singled out and warned the Mumbai anti-terrorism unit’s leadership. The email sent by the Indian Mujahidin specifically warned that Mumbai is on “our radar.” In comparing the technical capabilities of the pre-Mumbai attacks with the Mumbai attack, there is a clear leap. While the Indian Mujahideen used mostly crude bombs, the attackers in Mumbai have used modern weapons. Furthermore, by targeting Westerners, subcontinental threat groups have suggested they may seek to internationalize their domestic and regional issues. As threat groups in the subcontinent are interlinked, it is too early to conclusively identify the authors of the carnage in Mumbai.

Terrorist Motivation

To the terrorists, the attacks in Mumbai were carried out to avenge the mistreatment of Muslims. Their motivation was to avenge the deaths of Muslims killed in riots, the demolition of a historic mosque, and the mistreatment of Muslims in India. Instead of living with injustice, the attackers believed it better to fight and die. This is typical indoctrination by Muslim threat groups in the subcontinent, both in India and in Pakistan. When they were told that commandos were coming to kill them, they said that they have prepared for them and that this is only a trailer and that there will be more to come. They were indoctrinated into believing that the Indian commandos were trained by Israelis and Israelis were providing weapons to kill Muslims. They also said that no one is complaining about Israelis inflicted suffering on Palestinians.

The motivation driving the terrorists to attack is best exemplified in two phone calls recorded between the terrorists and India TV’s anchor. Speaking in English and Urdu, terrorists at Oberoi Hotel and Nariman House phoned India TV at the height of the attack. A terrorist identifying himself as Shadullah using cellphone number 09769679723, which belonged to Lisa Ringner, a Swedish guest in room 1856 at the Hotel Oberoi, phoned India TV’s popular number 93505 93505 at 9.30 a.m. on November 27, 2008.[11] A transcript of the call reads as follows:

A second call was placed from another terrorist identifying himself as Imran Babar, once employed as a medical representative with a multinational company. Using the cellphone number 9819464530 belonging to Holtzberg Gaverlein, Nariman House, Imran Babar called India TV’s popular number kept aside for viewers 93505 93505 at 5.07 p.m. on November 27, 2008.[12]

Failure to Respond

Every successful terrorist attack is an intelligence failure. India will need to restructure its security and intelligence apparatus as well as its quick reaction forces. Their performance fell behind the scale of the threat facing India in Mumbai. Despite Mumbai suffering from terrorism during past decades and repeated warnings, there was no mechanism in place to protect the city efficiently and effectively. Ten months ago, a member of a Pakistani terror group told Indian police that he had carried out reconnaissance on the two hotels. [13] Intelligence pointing to an attack in Mumbai was relayed to domestic security authorities, but it is unclear whether the government acted on the information. At the Taj Mahal Hotel, the scene of much of the bloodshed, had tightened security had reportedly tightened in the weeks before the attack after warning circulated of a possible threat. But according to the owner of the hotel, the additional measures were dropped just days before the siege.[14] India's own intelligence services repeatedly warned of plots to attack Mumbai from the sea. [15]
American intelligence sources confirmed that the US warned India twice that Pakistan-based militants were planning attacks - and that iconic buildings like the Taj Hotel could be among the targets.[16] However, India lacked the good analysis and operational planning needed to anticipate and respond to the threat.

Implications for the Hospitality Industry

The unprecedented attack in Mumbai will have major implications for travel, tourism, investment and several other sectors, hotels in particular. In Mumbai, most of the targets attacked were not government targets. This places a huge burden on government and private sector. Increasingly 90-95% of infrastructure in India is owned and operated by the private sector. Without an enduring partnership between these two crucial sectors, future security of a nation cannot be guaranteed. For instance, in protecting hotels, it is imperative for the exterior security to be jointly staffed by hotel security and government security.

Immediately after the attack began, the hotels in Mumbai went on high alert. Ms. Archana Tyagi Sharma, from the office of the Commissioner of Police, visited several hotel properties on the second day of the crisis along with her team to check the security arrangements. Ms. Sharma suggested watch towers should have better surveillance and advised an increase in the height of the periphery fencing of the hotel in totality, as well as the hiring of more private, armed security guards. Most international hotels requested that the government provide them with armed commando units and even offered that the cost be taken care of by the hotel.

One of the best secured hotel chains in the world, the JW Marriott Mumbai, went over and above “Threat Condition Red,” the highest threat alert. Restaurants, discothèques, banqueting halls, pools, and other public areas were kept closed for two days as per the instructions from local Indian authorities. All the main gates and beach sides were manned by armed local police. Similarly, no vehicles were allowed to enter except vehicles belonging to the hotel and only after proper checks were conducted by security guards and canine units. All vehicles were directed to outsource paid parking.

Furthermore, guest profile screening was conducted at the main entry gate before entering the hotel. Only in-house guests or guests with reservations at the hotel were allowed to enter the hotel premises. No walk-in guests were allowed to enter in the hotel premises. Visitors for in-house guest were allowed after proper verification from the in-house guest and after checking their photo identification. Visitors were then escorted by the in-house guest. Guests entering the hotel were frisked by security at the entry gate. A register to check in and out was maintained at the entry gate for in-house guests. The main gates were closed, locked and kept blocked by hotel vehicles. Visitors were not allowed into the hotel unless essential work was to be carried out. Likewise, vendor vehicles were not allowed at the loading dock and supplies were shifted from the gate after a thorough check conducted by security and canine units. An additional register for checking in and out was maintained at the main associate entry gate. Security measures were also placed at the beach side.

Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) Railway station in Mumbaii

The Future

The terrorists that staged the al-Qaeda-style attack in Mumbai could attack again. Although the terrorist operatives have been neutralized, the masterminds that planned and the infrastructure used to prepare the attack on India's financial capital is intact. The ideology that motivated the attackers and generated the support is still intact.

Asian terrorism is on the rise. The epicentre of international terrorism has now shifted to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a region straddling India and China. Today, the world's top four countries that suffer from terrorism are Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and India.   Unless India and Pakistan work together, both these countries will suffer heavily from terrorism in the coming years.

Conclusion

The terrorist attack in Mumbai should serve as a reminder to governments that terrorism is a global threat. Unless governments understand that terrorism is a transnational threat, and that they must work together to counter it, they will continue to suffer from attacks.  The spearhead of effective and efficient counterterrorism is intelligence. The key to fighting the current and emerging wave of terrorism will rest on India's future ability to develop sound and timely intelligence and to develop liaison partnerships for intelligence sharing. The Indian security and intelligence services failed on both these counts.

India should strengthen its coverage of threat groups by investing in high grade, high quality intelligence collection at home and by building intelligence sharing partnerships with its neighbours overseas. Instead of accusing Pakistan for every attack on Indian soil, Indian leaders must understand that both India and Pakistan face a common threat. Without building a robust relationship with Pakistan, India has been strengthening its cooperation with Israel and the U.S.  As the regional power, India must take the lead and reach out to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka and share counter terrorism intelligence. It will require a visionary Indian leader to understand the change in paradigm after September 11, 2001, and build the structures to protect India from within and overseas.

Mumbai is a wakeup call for countries and people who have not taken the threat of terrorism and extremism seriously. Terrorism is the most serious national security challenge confronting the world today. To win, building skill and will at all levels of government is paramount. There is no better investment than educating leaders, including leaders at the highest level of government. India should call for a summit of Asian leaders to better understand the emerging threat in Asia and develop a plan of action aimed at reducing and managing the threat.