As news of Saturday’s tragic shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh broke, the nation soon learned of the vile hate that motivated the alleged attacker, a 46-year-old white man named Robert Bowers.
Before most people even knew that terrorist outreach was happening online, YouTube was a top recruitment venue for jihadi terrorist groups.
In August, I wrote an analysis on an increasingly evident aim by the Islamic State (ISIS) “to establish a more substantial base in the Philippines.”
Shahada News Agency, the media unit for Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement, al-Qaeda’s (AQ) Somali branch, reported the executions of 5 alleged spies.
On February 27, pro-al-Qaeda (AQ) Telegram channels began distributing a statement from a group calling itself “Hurras al-Deen” (“Guardians of the Religion”).
Islamic State (IS) and pro-IS media units have turned to the Baaz social media platform as a new means of propaganda distribution.
The July 14, 2016 attack in Nice, France has brought a great deal of attention to the Islamic State’s (IS) use of French in its propaganda.
Munther Omar Saleh, a 20 year-old N.Y. college student accused of plotting an attack in the U.S., maintained a popular Twitter account within the online Islamic State (IS) community.
The Afghan Taliban remarked on the recent protests to the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo by Afghans in Kabul, expressing solidarity with people in their outrage to cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad
An alleged Islamic State (IS) fighter on Twitter forwarded a series of lengthy guides regarding migration to live under the group, laying out suggestions for packing, handling interrogations in Turkish airports, and crossing the Turkish border.
The Afghan Taliban published an article on its website critical of Muslim leaders who have been silent to cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in France, and have also expressed solidarity with the enemy, and warned that “the Kouachi lions will come again to teach another lesson to Charlie Hebdo and other enemies of Islam”.
A member of al-Kinana Foundation, the media arm of the jihadi group Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt), wrote an article explaining why the group operates in Egypt versus another country, and urging the people to wage a “jihadi revolutionary war”.
As the Islamic State (IS) continues its march to expand its Caliphate into more regions of Syria and Iraq, suicide operations have been one of its most valuable weapons.
Man Haron Monis, an Iranian-born man living in Australia, who died along with two hostages following his siege of a café in Sydney, maintained a consistent and self-promoting online presence in recent months.
On Friday, October 3, 2014, the Islamic State (IS) released three English video releases and a set of photos within hours and posted it all posted on Twitter. These four releases raise a question, though: Why did IS release so much material in one day addressed to the West.
A recent move by al-Qaeda’s wing in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, illustrates again the importance of social media for the global jihadi movement and its effect on the evolution in jihadi online platforms.
In an unexpected and unprecedented turn of events, al-Qaeda members and jihadists from all over the world who embrace the ideology of global jihad are now doubting the group’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and calling for his removal.
On December 5, 2013, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) joined the long list of al-Qaeda affiliates with a presence on Twitter.
After years of threatening Hezbollah and Iranian interests in Lebanon, and solely claiming responsibility for attacks outside the country, the Brigades of Abdullah Azzam took credit for the November 19, 2013, twin suicide bombings near the Iranian embassy in Beirut.
The Shabaab al-Mujahideen's attack and four-day-long siege at the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya demonstrated a new trend in al-Qaeda's online media strategies, as online communication from the al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia was routed exclusively through social media sites.